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ABSTRACT
Guatemala has, until today, struggled to achieve security and justice following the end of
nearly half a century of civil war in 1996. One specific institution, the International
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), has been implemented to rectify
many of the Guatemalan state’s difficulties in establishing and maintaining the rule of
law. In this thesis, I look to better explain CICIG’s role in Guatemala relative to security
and justice in a post-conflict setting: I define CICIG as an institution potentially capable
of building societal trust, and I explain how the inclusion of procedural justice within
transitional justice can help it do that. I also explain CICIG’s transitional justice-based
role, both institutionally and functionally. CICIG is afflicted with issues that have arisen
in a post-conflict setting, after all. Finally, I analyze and discuss CICIG’s successes and
drawbacks relative to both its organizational mandate and the goals of transitional justice,
and I make recommendations on how CICIG and/or other similarly constituted
institutions could be made to function more efficiently and effectively.
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I. INTRODUCTION:
GUATEMALA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST
IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG)
I.1 Background
Guatemala underwent nearly half a century of a simmering, mostly low-intensity civil
war. The two main parties to the conflict were the left-wing revolutionary guerillas and a
repressive, conservative military-governed state, buttressed by material and ideological
support from the United States. By 1996, Guatemala arrived at an internationally
brokered and very comprehensive set of peace accords. Following the signing of the
peace accords, however, the country experienced an intense post-conflict wave of crime,
violence, and related impunity. The 1996 peace accords committed to a comprehensive
set of reforms aimed at transforming Guatemalan society away from the huge structural
barriers that had long beleaguered the country, especially its Mayan-Indigenous
populations which comprise roughly half of the country’s citizens. Reforms were initially
agreed upon by government, elites, guerilla combatants, and civil society alike—the
prevailing wisdom was that they would be rubber-stamped into law through a
referendum, a necessity to permit such changes to the country’s constitution. Guatemala’s
elites, however, organized and financed a nefarious though successful campaign,
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resorting to fear tactics and intimidation, to reject the adoption of the comprehensive set
of equity effecting reforms in the 1999 referendum.1
To give an idea of the extent of the violence that plagued Guatemala shortly after
concluding its peace accords, Guatemala had one of the highest crime rates in Central
America, which as a region, has among the highest crime rates in the world.2 The murder
rate at the height of the post-conflict violence wave, for example, was at 50 homicides
per 100,000 people per year,3 with a conviction rate below 2%.4 Additionally, amnesties
were granted to virtually every soldier and officer in the Guatemalan military, despite
widespread evidence of severe and systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by the
military and its paramilitary charges.5 Compounding the issue even further, many former
state military and police officials took advantage of their amnesties and existing wartime
networks to engage in criminal activity and networking. 6 This consisted of either
providing clandestine security for criminal activity, or providing logistical and
administrative support for such criminal activity while working within state institutions.
By 2003, criminal impunity reached such proportions that domestic and
international concerns led to the establishment of the Commission of the Investigation of
Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations (“CICIACS”)—the “first attempt
to break the cycle of impunity in Guatemala.” 7 CICIACS was subsequently deemed
illegal by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court (“GCC”), but the ruthless murder and
attempted cover-up of three Salvadoran members of the Central American Parliament

1

Janneke van Hemmen, “Influence of NGOs in the Establishment Process of the International Commission
Against Impunity in Post-Conflict Guatemala,” (Master of Arts Thesis, Utrecht University, 2012): 32.
2
Raquel Aldana, “A Reflection on Transitional Justice in Guatemala 15 Years After the Peace
Agreements,” in Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse, ed. T. Bonacker and C.
Safferling, (The Hague: Asser Press, 2013): 299.
3
Michael Shifter, “Central America’s Security Predicament,” Current History 110.733 (February 2011):
51.
4
Roger Atwood, Advocates Against Impunity: A Case Study on Human Rights Organizing in Guatemala,
(Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), December 2008): 3.
5
The crimes of genocide, forced disappearances, and torture were excluded, but this was more of a
rhetorical distinction in Guatemala—barely any amnesties have been challenged.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza. “Making the State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions and
International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict Guatemala.” Chicago Journal of
International Law 9.1 (Summer 2008): 84.
6
“The Americas: Reaching the Untouchables; Guatemala and Organised Crime,” The Economist 394.8673
March 13, 2010.
7
Matthew Evans Golab, “Guatemala’s Fight Against Criminal Impunity: CICIG, A Hybrid Approach,”
(Hon. Bachelor’s Thesis, University of Arizona, May 2010): 29.
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effectively forced the government to address criminal violence and impunity within its
borders.8 The United Nations, Guatemalan civil society, and the Guatemalan government
crafted the framework for a “watered-down version” of CICIACS so as to be able to
secure it through the GCC. 9 They removed the previously-extant clause ensuring
independent prosecutorial capacity for the commission.10 The new proposal was titled the
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (“CICIG”) and it was ratified
and entered into force by September 2007.11 The following pages will focus primarily on
CICIG, especially as it relates to transitional justice.

I.2 Guatemalan Power Relations: A Necessary Consideration
This thesis project goes to great lengths to provide an array of contexts by which to
understand CICIG. But in discussions with several scholars concerning the
epistemological lens of this project as it was in its closing stages, I realized that a
background discussion of Guatemalan power relations would prove to be a helpful
rejoinder to my existing analysis. For example, the several chapters in this thesis paint a
picture of both optimism and concern at once, relative to CICIG. I believe that such
divergent viewpoints are, at the very least, partially evident through my discussion of
contemporary Guatemalan history and politics. But, the latent power differentials within
Guatemalan society have the ability to shift the “situation on the ground” in directions
unforeseen and usually in favour of the deeply entrenched socio-economic, political, and
military elites. Realistically, they always have. For example, what looked like a
democratic, populist revolution in 1944 was reversed by 1954. Moreover, Guatemala was
the site of some of the more comprehensive peace accords in modern history in 1996,12
while by 1999, all but the most banal of the stipulations made in the peace accords had
8

Julia Schünemann, “Looking The Monster In The Face”: The International Commission Against Impunity
In Guatemala And The “Rule Of Law-Builders Contract,” (Initiative for Peacebuilding and FRIDE: A
European Think Tank for Global Action, IFP Security Cluster: Country Case Study, Guatemala, October
2010): 15.
9
Roger Atwood, Advocates Against Impunity, 2.
10
“Agreement Between The United Nations and the Government of Guatemala for the Establishment of a
Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala
(“CICIACS”),” The United Nations, March 13, 2003, accessed April 15 2015; available from
http://www.un.org/News/dh/guatemala/ciciacs-eng.pdf: 3.
11
Van Hemmen, “Influence of NGOs,” 41.
12
Angelika Rettberg, “The Private Sector and Peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia,” Journal of
Latin American Studies 39 (2007): 474.
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been effectively scuttled. Finally, just two short years ago, Efraín Ríos Montt was the
first former head of state to be convicted of committing genocide, only to be reversed on
a technicality ten days later. In fact, at the time of writing, he had been deemed
psychologically unfit to stand trial again by medical professionals.13
I recognize that an explicit accounting for and explanation of these power
differentials will help guide the reader to better understand how Guatemalan society has
historically functioned, and in many ways continues to do so today. At the same time, in
the interests of focusing primarily on the contemporary era that this thesis deals with, I
must necessarily refrain from providing a comprehensive history dating back 500 years. I
make the case in the following pages, most notably in Chapter Three and the Conclusion,
that sub-sections of Guatemalan society have become involved in demanding
accountability from the Guatemalan government with a greater potential for success than
the country has ever experienced. That argument notwithstanding, I offer two specific
caveats: first, that without a greater transnational focus dedicated to issues related to
organized crime which grip not only Guatemala, but various other states in Latin America
at varying levels of influence, organized crime will continue to evade law enforcement
efforts in any specific country or bilateral partnership between countries. Secondly,
without greater sustainability mechanisms built into CICIG, organized crime as well as
elite networks fomenting criminal impunity in Guatemala as a means of consolidating
power and expanding profits, generally speaking,14 will be able to “wait out” CICIG’s
mandate and then resume once the organization has run its course.
13

This recent development took place after the research and writing of this thesis had taken place. It is
important to note, however, as it has the potential to effectively and conclusively allow Ríos Montt to evade
retributive justice. See “Guatemala: Ex-Ruler Rios Montt Found Unfit for Trial,” BBC News, July 8, 2015,
accessed August 10, 2015; available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33438374.
14 One common political economy-influenced argument tends to argue that failing wide-ranging cultural,
structural, and constitutional reforms within Guatemala, any attempts at justice will fall short of changing
the status quo over the long term. My argument is ostensibly the same, however I outline some ways by
which CICIG can do so, such as working directly with civil society organizations to build critical mass and
power that has the ability to at least visibly challenge Guatemalan state power; or by changing the
organizational mandate so as to train and empower a much greater number of security and justice sector
civil servants. For more on the political economy-inspired views of peace and justice in post-conflict
Guatemala, see M. Gabriela Torres, “Imagining Social Justice Amidst Guatemala’s Post-Conflict
Violence,” Studies in Social Justice 2.1 (2008): 7. Also see Nicola Short, The International Politics of PostConflict Reconstruction in Guatemala, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); and Rachel Sieder, “Legal
Globalization and Human Rights: Constructing the Rule of Law in Postconflict Guatemala?” In Human
Rights in the Maya Region, eds. Pedro Pitarch, Shannon Speed, and Xochitl Leyva Solano, 67-90.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008): 85.
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Guatemala experienced “ten years of spring” from 1944 until the Central
Intelligence Agency-led coup d’état of 1954, where the country toyed with populist
democratic governance and agrarian reform. 15 Greg Grandin’s influential treatise on
ethnicity and identity in Guatemala outlines post-World War Two socio-economic
upheaval as the reason grassroots democracy was able to gain a foothold in the country.
That being said, however, Indigenous populations in Guatemala were largely on the
margin of that grassroots democracy movement even then, according to Grandin.16 Put
differently, Guatemala’s highly stratified society has historically and contemporarily
excluded Mayan-Indigenous populations, even in moments of social unrest and antipathy
towards extant societal disparity. Explained differently, for Mayan-Indigenous
populations in Guatemala, as Dinorah Azpuru’s academic polling project has uncovered,
the nuances between long-standing elites in Guatemala, a newly ascendant middle class,
and international community responses like CICIG are all more or less similar—their
similarity lies precisely in the foreignness and difference from the values and worldview
of Mayan society. As a result, rural Indigenous-Mayan populations tend to feel only a
very marginally greater level of trust for CICIG than for existing state institutions, to
offer a tangible example of how this phenomenon plays out. 17 Not only that, but
Guatemalan Mayan-Indigenous populations have faced disappointment and, at best, a
lack of participation, representation, and importance in Guatemala-wide societal
processes from time immemorial, which only compounds their collective feelings of
apathy and mistrust.
At the same time, one can hardly afford to discount the experiences of millions of
Guatemalans who do not fall into a Mayan-Indigenous status, yet fail to meet levels of
exclusivity determined by the country’s elites.18 This point is often lost or obscured by
scholars taking a purely constructivist ontological assessment of the socio-political
15

One particularly useful and succinct explanation of this time period can be found here: Jason A. Klocek,
How Religious Actors Influence the Politics of Transitional Justice: Truth Recovery and Reconciliation in
South African and Guatemala, (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, 2009): 56.
16
Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation, (Durham: Duke University Press,
2000): 223-231.
17 Dinorah Azpuru, “Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2010” in Democratic Consolidation in
the Americas in Hard Times: IX Study of Democratic Culture of Guatemalans. (Nashville: Latin American
Public Opinion Project – Vanderbilt University, May 2011): 164.
18
Since the end of the Guatemalan civil war, these elite statuses are usually now recognized in subdivided
units consisting of power deriving from either military-security or socio-economic ties.

5

realities in Latin America, especially when they approach the issue with a lens focused on
political economy. It is a subtlety that ought to be noted—indeed, the point remains that
the non-elite masses wrested control from the state’s powerful elites for ten years
following World War Two, only to be reversed by an American organized and committed
coup d’état. The United States government and general public remained “ignorant [and]
ethnocentric [of the Guatemalan reality and social history, while being] shrouded in Cold
War paranoia.” 19 Gleijeses even goes on to describe the American media as largely
having been fully supportive of the state and disbelieving of allegations of American
involvement in Guatemalan politics at the time.20 Indeed, it was largely due to major
agrarian reforms planned, and Jacobo Arbenz’s Guatemalan administration enforcing a
policy of rent-seeking from banana exports from the United Fruit Company, that the
United States decided to overthrow the Arbenz government. 21 The vast majority of
scholarly material related to this coup barely makes mention of Guatemalan sociopolitical forces of the era—the Guatemalan elites that emerged in power following the
counter-revolution in 1954 are usually pitted as benefactors of American decision-making
who could be trusted to maintain the status quo. In other words, those who benefited in
Guatemala from the American-led coup were the traditional elites. It was American
involvement, not an elite-driven process which resulted in the re-disenfranchisement of
Guatemala’s vast numbers of non-elite peasants.
One should, however, take note of two points: first, Guatemala’s IndigenousMayan populations have never held any modicum of state level power, regardless of
where the balance of power lies in Guatemalan society. Secondly, between the emergence
of global human rights norms and transnational civil society socio-political power,22 I
argue that the potential looms much greater than at any point in recent memory for
Guatemala’s most historically dispossessed, its Mayan-Indigenous populations, as well as
its Ladino rural poor populations, to express some level of power, unforeseen in the

19

Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992): 367.
20 Ibid, 368.
21
Marcelo Bucheli, “Good Dictator, Bad Dictator: United Fruit Company and Economic Nationalism in
Central America in the Twentieth Century,” Working Paper, 2006, accessed August 9, 2015; available
from https://business.illinois.edu/working_papers/papers/06-0115.pdf: 6.
22 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011): 97.
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country’s long history to date, through the force of their sheer numbers, if by no other
means.23
I feel confident in summing up Guatemalan socio-political power relations with
several suppositions. To begin with, the Mayan-Indigenous populations as well as
Guatemala’s Ladino rural poor have consistently received maltreatment at the hands of
the country’s/colony’s powerbrokers throughout its history. This is a reality that has
remained stable and constant throughout hundreds of years. But analysts must look
deeper than a mere indigenous-peasant versus elite divide to properly understand power
differentials and how that power has historically functioned—that is, the elite,
powerbroker role in any given time period of Guatemala’s recent history is fluid. In 1954,
American support for a regime change was the most salient factor in reversing populist
gains. In 1999, the prospective gains for Guatemalan society’s most socially and
ethnically underprivileged as represented by clauses and agreements in Guatemala’s 1996
peace accords were effectively defeated by a well-calculated, heavily financed blitz
campaign to have Guatemalans vote against their constitutional adoption. 24 The most
substantial factors in this instance of poor and indigenous disenfranchisement were the
interests of the country’s long-established socio-economic elites looking to protect their
extremely low corporate and personal tax levels, and in avoiding redistribution of land
and wealth—the source of this landed class’ power. Finally, the reversal of Ríos Montt’s
prosecution has served the interests of the country’s “new entrepeneurs,” which differ
significantly from those of the country’s “traditional oligarchy,”25 and tend to have ties to
either the military and/or transnational organized crime. The important lesson to be taken
away from these processes which disenfranchise poor and Indigenous Guatemalan
populations is that the processes are by no means a static equation. It is never as simple as
“elite” versus “indigenous” or “poor.” While the latter part of that equation tends to stay
more or less stable in Guatemala, what consists of “elite” or at least the powerbroker for

23

Rachel Sieder suggests that 50-60% of Guatemala’s population of 12 million (at the time of writing in
2008) is indigenous. See Sieder, “Legal Globalization and Human Rights,” 77.
24 Corinne Caumartin and Diego Sanchez-Ancochea, “Explaining a Contradictory Record: The Case of
Guatemala,” in Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development, eds. Arnim Langer, Frances
Stewart, and Rajesh Venugopal, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): 181.
25 Schünemann, “Looking The Monster In The Face,” 13.
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socio-political change in Guatemala has been changing with comparative regularity in the
post-war period.
Two other key factors in power relations in Guatemala are salient: First of all,
international pressure can and has continually effected sociopolitical change in
Guatemala in the post-war period, though in a variety of ways. In 1954, American
economic and geopolitical interests were the impetus for a conservative, military-backed
regime change. By the mid-1980s, global geopolitical pressure for liberalization and
democratization was a major factor leading Guatemala’s initial shift away from military
governance for the first time in over thirty years.26 More recently, the push to establish
CICIACS and then CICIG in the early and mid 2000s was prompted by intense
international lobbying and pressure from state actors and governmental organizations but
also by international civil society decrying the lack of justice and stability in the
country.27 With such a historical record to reflect upon, Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of the
Justice Cascade effectively describes the extant interplay in Guatemala between major
civil society norm entrepeneurship combined with the international and localized
adoption of such norms through legislation and legal precedent.28
Once again I want to remind the reader of my earlier caveats in this section: first,
that for CICIG to be a successful institution at combatting impunity in Guatemala, a
simultaneous greater focus on combating organized crime from a transnational
perspective ought to be adopted. Secondly, greater sustainability mechanisms are
required within CICIG’s organizational mandate. There are still many obstacles to
achieving justice and the enfranchisement of a long-destitute population (and/or
populations) in Guatemala. Despite various justice-related successes that can be traced, at
least in part, to CICIG’s actions, the overturning of Ríos Montt’s genocide conviction and
subsequent finding of him to be mentally unable to stand trial again is a stark reminder of
how fragile and reversible socio-political “progress” still is in the country. I, and many
other analysts looking at Guatemala, remain cautiously optimistic though.
26

Rettberg, “The Private Sector and Peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia,” 474.
Roger Atwood argues that CICIG is an example of how “a broad-based [international] coalition, and
judicious use of international pressure can make a successful human rights campaign.” See Atwood,
Advocates Against Impunity, 1.
28
This is the basic premise of her entire theory. To read her summary of the theory, see Part IV:
Conclusions in Sikkink, Justice Cascade, 225-261.

27
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The differences between today and 1954 are important to note here: first of all,
human rights have become a normatively powerful institution on the global stage.
Secondly, international civil society has developed into a major geopolitical force, and
that includes civil society devoted to the promotion of human rights. Thirdly, CICIG is a
force that is maintaining the spotlight on Guatemala from within, but also broadcasting
the state of its affairs in the country throughout the rest of the world as well, thus creating
a mechanism of international accountability. And finally, Guatemalans have reached a
crescendo of frustration at the status quo of severe income and social disparity in the
country once again,29 unseen at such levels since 1944. While perhaps not likely, all of
these simultaneously salient factors have the potential to transform Guatemalan society,
at least incrementally, in favour of more socio-economic parity, and lesser impunity.
Whether they will actually congeal do so, however, remains to be seen. That being said, I
do believe, and this thesis argues at length, that a shift in CICIG’s mandate to training
greater numbers of civil servants and more deeply engaging civil society, in addition to
developing a more comprehensive transnational strategy at controlling and combating
international organized crime networks will go a long way in assisting such a societal
transformation.

I.3 Methodology
Throughout the following pages, I employ a number of methodological approaches.
Broadly speaking, I employ both case studies and process tracing methods to illustrate
cause and effect when I deem causation to be important to my analysis. Though some
scholars have heavily warned against choosing region-specific case studies, 30 or to at
least be careful to follow specific criteria when studying regionally focused cases, 31
David Collier usefully points out that region-specific case studies have provided the bulk

29

Of special note, social media and contemporary technology has apparently been invaluable in assisting
this contemporary protest movement to establish a critical mass. See Tim Rogers, “Beginner’s Luck: How
9 Strangers Used Facebook to Launch Guatemala’s Biggest Protest Movement in 50 Years,” Fusion, June
14, 2015, accessed July 3, 2015, available from http://fusion.net/story/150179/how-9-strangers-usedfacebook-to-launch-guatemalas-biggest-protest-movement-in-50-years/.
30
Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2.3
(April 1970): 337-363.
31
Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in
Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2.1 (1990): 131-150.
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of theoretical value to the field which would otherwise render cross-area studies much
less valuable.32 Thus, in the first chapter, I utilize both local and more international case
studies in an effort to find common ground between them and endowing my analysis with
greater cross-case veracity. Ian Lustick specifically calls this technique “quasitriangulation,” 33 suggesting that it is useful in either corroborating or falsifying the
relationship that one is trying to measure. In the first chapter, I am looking to develop a
theoretical argument discussing the importance of increased temporality and
responsiveness as a means of enhancing transitional justice outcomes.
Chapter Two is split into two distinct parts: locating CICIG’s functions relative to
transitional justice; and locating CICIG’s institutional composition relative to other
transitional justice institutions. For the former, I utilize process tracing combined with
both “quasi-triangulation” and “explicit triage” to exhibit my theorized relationship
between truth, acknowledgment, and retribution relative to CICIG.34 By “explicit triage,”
I mean to say that I use existing transitional justice literature concerning truth recovery,
acknowledgment, and retribution in order to locate CICIG within the functional melée of
transitional justice processes. Through the synthesis and analysis of such literatures, I am
then able to establish a triangulation whereby I can better explain the relationship
between CICIG and each of the three interrelated processes. For the latter part of the
chapter, I borrow heavily from Przeworski and Teune’s “most similar systems”
comparative method.35 My aim for this part of the chapter is to find one or more similar
institutions within the transitional justice lexicon to that of CICIG. As the reader will see,
my search for similar institutions to CICIG led me to El Salvador’s truth commission:
“most similar systems” design then allows me to control for concomitant variation and
narrow the potential lessons that can be drawn from such a comparison. That being said, I
do not attempt to extract lessons to be learned from the comparison of the two
institutions. Rather, my interest was merely in debunking the rather pervasive
understanding in the existing literature that views CICIG as a solitary institution. I
32

David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II ed. Ada
W. Finifter. (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1993): 112.
33
Ian Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the
Problem of Selection Bias.” American Political Science Review 90.3 (September 1996): 616.
34
Ibid., 610.
35
For a more detailed description of such methods, see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of
Comparative Social Inquiry, (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
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believe that I have established academic value in such a comparison by allowing other
academics to take up the task from an institution that had previously been almost
universally described as a “unique” or “new” institutional design necessarily imbued with
little comparative value as a result of that categorization.36
Chapter Three shifts away from theoretical mapping towards more policy-based
analysis. Similar to the second chapter, Chapter Three also has two separate parts to it:
First, I analyze the successes and drawbacks of CICIG relative to its mandate, and
subsequently analyze CICIG’s strengths and weaknesses relative to its transitional justice
functions which I establish theoretically in the preceding chapter. This methodology, as I
see it, is most akin to “thick description,”37 while being guided by an ethos of “quasitriangulation.”38 Ostensibly, I am looking to draw policy guidance out of the ether of
CICIG’s positive and negative outcomes—thick description is required, then, to establish
the framework by which to triangulate policy prescription. By locating a focal point
between the positive and negative outcomes that CICIG has affected relative to its
mandate and also transitional justice functions, I am better able to establish a richer
contextual basis from which to recommend policy that mitigates negative outcomes and
enhances and proliferates positive ones.

I.4 Literature
The literature utilized in the following pages, similar to methodology, is something of a
mixed bag. My own epistemological academic outlook tends to be heavily influenced by
constructivist ideas and literature, so there is certainly a notable focus in the literature
utilized in this thesis on norm diffusion, civil society influence, and complex symbioses
between state and non-state actors. That said, each chapter has its own more specific
influences as well. While the constructivist influences will become obvious to the reader
throughout the following pages, I would like to outline some of the more diverse or
particular influences utilized in each chapter:

36

Schünemann, “Looking The Monster In The Face,” 28.
For a deeper discussion of “thick description,” see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures:
Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
38
Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science,” 616.
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In Chapter One, I look at the most influential writers on procedural justice outside
of the transitional justice paradigm to initiate my own theoretical underpinnings. Tom R.
Tyler and John Rawls serve as the most important theorists I use for bridging the two
aforementioned forms of justice. Tyler comes at the discipline of procedural justice from
a social psychological background, specifically looking to account for the motivations
and determinants for group behaviour.39 John Rawls comes at the same issue with an aim
to understand what, exactly, constitutes the foundations of a functional society from a
legalist-philosophical epistemology.40 Together, Tyler and Rawls form the backbone by
which I lay my transitional justice-focused theoretical constructs relative to procedural
justice. Outside of their contributions, I lean most heavily on transitional justice-focused
scholars who are working on including procedural justice models into their consideration
of transitional justice. Nickson and Braithwaite argue for a more robust and less
conventional rethinking of transitional justice away from the preeminent legalist
conceptions that have long dominated the discipline. 41 I tend to lean on these three
influences the most in constructing my conception of responsiveness and temporality as
being the vehicles by which procedural justice is activated, while simultaneously being
crucial factors in strengthening transitional justice processes.
Chapter Two borrows from several strands of transitional justice literature:
Hybrid institutions in the transitional justice lexicon; the role of trials and retribution in
transitional justice; the role of memory in post-conflict reconstruction; and transitional
justice measures of breaking with the past in order to forge a new way forward.
Ostensibly, the literature I looked at melded a focus on Latin American transitional
justice with general theory concerning each of truth, acknowledgment, and retribution,
while also trying to account for CICIG’s hybrid nature. From a Guatemalan perspective,
Lisa J. Laplante,42 Anita Isaacs,43 Rachel Sieder,44 Janneke van Hemmen,45 and Markus
39

For further discussion, see, Tom R. Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure,” International
Journal of Psychology 35.2 (2000): 117-125.
40
In my opinion, Rawls’ views relative to procedural justice are most directly presented here,
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness as a Political Conception of Justice,” in What is Justice? Classic and
Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., eds. Robert C. Solomon and Mary C Murphy, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
41
Ray Nickson and John Braithwaite, “Deeper, Broader, Longer Transitional Justice,” European Journal of
Criminology 11.4 (2014): 445-463.
42
Lisa J. Laplante, “Dialogues of Transitional Justice—Memory Battles: Guatemala’s Public Debates and
the Genocide Trial of Jose Efraín Ríos Montt,” Quinnipiac Law Review 32 (2014): 621-673.
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Schultze-Kraft were most heavily instructive, 46 as each of these authors melded a
particular theme mentioned above with localized Guatemalan and/or Central American
experiences. The second chapter analyzes CICIG’s role relative to the transitional justice
processes of truth, acknowledgment, and retribution. Among the more influential
analyses from which I constructed a conceptualization of the role CICIG played vis-à-vis
truth, acknowledgment, and retribution were produced by the likes of Lieselotte
Viaene,47 looking at the function of truth amongst Guatemalan indigenous populations.
Charles Villa-Vicencio, 48 widely renowned for his path-breaking theoretical work
relative to acknowledgment and reconciliation, was also important in reconciling how
each of truth, acknowledgment, and retribution interconnected. Finally, Naomi RohtArriaza, 49 analyzing retributive justice theory in Latin America from a constructivist
bend, was vital to my understanding of how varying conceptions of justice within a
given society can serve to confound efforts to produce justice outcomes. Roht-Arriaza’s
work was doubly important in the writing of this chapter thanks to how much critical
thought her scholarship prompted me to engage in. Her depiction of the historical legacy
of impunity in Guatemala really forced me to deeply consider how the state can
overcome or at least functionally reconcile itself to such deep-seated historical legacies.
My third and final chapter leans heavily on recent scholarship specific to CICIG,
the issues it faces, and its prospects for success. Unfortunately, the majority of work to
this end emanates from civil society: non-profit organizations and non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), mainly. That is not to say that it is without value—lacking in
primary research, this thesis literally could not have proceeded without such a rich,
43

Anita Isaacs, “Truth and the Challenge of Reconciliation in Guatemala,” in Reconciliation(s):
Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, ed. Joanna R. Quinn, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2009).
44
Rachel Sieder, “War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,” in The Politics of Memory, eds.
Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
45
Janneke van Hemmen, “Influence of NGOs.”
46
Markus Schultze-Kraft, “Security and the Rule of Law in Colombia and Guatemala: Priorities, Trade-offs
and Interdependencies,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4 (March 2012): 135-157.
47
Lieselotte Viaene, “The Internal Logic of the Cosmos as ‘Justice’ and ‘Reconciliation’: Micro-Level
Perceptions in Post-Conflict Guatemala,” Critique of Anthropology 30.3 (September 2010): 287-312.
48
Charles Villa-Vicencio, “The Politics of Reconciliation,” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace
Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
2006).
49
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Making the State Do Justice.”
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diverse, and instructive body of literature. But what remains is that such work is usually
heavy on policy prescription with less of a focus on theoretical development. The result
is that we gain a better understanding of issues plaguing Guatemala and CICIG
specifically, but a lack of theoretical development alongside such policy analysis renders
the lessons learned in the Guatemala/CICIG case difficult to apply in other settings.
Hudson and Taylor, then, proved to be specifically important: Their article in 2010 was
the first major academic inquiry into CICIG from the perspective of developing a
theoretical model by which to define and analyze it. 50 Their analysis provided the
impetus for several other theory-focused scholars to build upon, such as Donovan, 51
Schünemann,52 and Shipp, Jr.53
Peacock and Beltran’s investigation, commissioned by the Washington Office on
Latin America, in 2003 was exceptionally important in crafting Chapter Three because
they were among the first and most influential analysts to establish a basic map of the
function and flow of corruption, impunity, and otherwise illicit behaviour in
Guatemala. 54 Building on their analysis from a policy angle, and extremely useful in
better understanding policy implications of CICIG’s actions, Briscoe and Stappers, 55
Eduardo Stein—himself a former Guatemalan Vice President, 56 and the International
Crisis Group were most influential.57 The especially difficult part of Chapter Three was
to meld the limited theory currently established in relation to CICIG, along with the

50

Andrew Hudson and Alexandra W. Taylor, “The International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala: A New Model for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms,” Journal of International
Criminal Justice 8.1 (2010): 53-74.
51
Megan K. Donovan, “The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: Will
Accountability Prevail?” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 25 (Fall 2008): 779-824.
52
Julia Schünemann, 'Looking The Monster In The Face'.
53
Shipp, Jr.’s work, much like that of Joanna Quinn’s, was not so influential vis-à-vis direct citations in my
work, but gave me a very useful background and framework for understanding the politics of security in
Central America, which, of course, has a direct relationship with CICIG. George Fitzhugh Shipp, Jr. The
Mano Dura Promise: Dilemmas of Human Rights and Security in New Latin American Democracies,
(Masters Thesis – George Mason University, 2012).
54
Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltran, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala: Illegal Armed
Groups and the Forces Behind Them, (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2003).
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Policy Makers,” in A Decade of Change: Political, Economic, and Social Developments in Western
Hemisphere Affairs, (Inter-American Dialogue, September 2011).
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Learning to Walk Without a Crutch: An Assessment of the International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala, Latin America Report Number 36, International Crisis Group, 31 May 2011: 13.
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theoretical parameters which I developed in the first two chapters, and then reconcile
them with the litany of theory-shy policy papers and reports. That said, I do believe that I
have balanced the two in a useful manner from which to proceed for future analysts and
policymakers: that is truly the value I was hoping to impart with this chapter.

I.5 Contingencies and Considerations
Before proceeding into deeper analysis of the issue at hand—CICIG, Guatemala, and
transitional justice, that is—I want to make several necessary correctives and caveats.
With any major article, chapter, monograph, or book, one could probably conceive of a
plethora of rejoinders to submit for the reader’s consideration and this thesis is no
different. However there are several issues which specifically stand out to me as requiring
explanation: To begin with, I want to offer something of an apology to a great many
Spanish-speaking scholars and analysts working on Guatemala- and CICIG-related
research. The timeframe and requirements of this Master’s degree and related thesis were
not all that conducive to especially time-consuming research. As such, I felt that I had
two options in my research programme: I could engage both the English- and Spanishlanguage literature and research, but I would be limited in the quantity and depth of my
research due to the extra time that analysis in Spanish would take me as a non-native
speaker. The other alternative, the one which I decided to pursue, was to engage the
predominantly English-language research, while supplementing such research with
occasional Spanish-language research when it was particularly pertinent and/or there was
no English-language equivalent. Moving forward, now that I possess a much more
extensive background in theoretical and policy-related understanding relative to CICIG
and Guatemala specifically, but transitional justice and Latin America more generally, I
feel more confident in sacrificing some analytical and quantitative depth in favour of
including more Spanish-language sources in my research.
I have also refrained from including democracy in my analysis of CICIG,
Guatemala, and even transitional justice, per se. Analysts such as Teitel,58 Sikkink,59 or
58

Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press: 2000).
In this article, Sikkink argues the causal logic that because of international civil society actors advancing
the cause of human rights in Argentina, the country was forced to become more democratically compliant,
which subsequently led to greater accountability and justice for human rights violators. Though not
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the publication team of Olsen, Payne, and Reiter all argue that democracy—or the
strengthening of democracy—is something of an “end game” or ideal outcome for
transitional justice processes.60 I make no such claims. To me, this is ‘putting the cart
ahead of the horse,’ figuratively speaking. Even a small measure of enhanced justice
outcomes ought to be viewed positively. To me, the end goal of a high-functioning liberal
democracy obscures meaningful but incremental progress in local and non-retributive
forms of justice. These types of justice initiatives and outcomes are often the important
forms of justice to survivors of human rights violations.61 Moreover, I think that I make a
strong case that a foundation for intra-societal trust is required before one can even begin
to think about a truly equitable democracy. It is for this reason that I argue in favour of
procedural justice being included in the transitional justice lexicon in Guatemala and
elsewhere. In summary, Guatemala is a long way off from an equitable and liberal
democracy, but there are many important steps in between Guatemala’s historic stance of
antipathy towards human rights and justice afforded to its Indigenous-Mayan population
in particular, and the democratic ideal. In my view, such steps are obscured by an
excessive focus on democracy.
One final issue that I wish to clarify is that because CICIG and Guatemala’s
security and justice reform processes, as well as its transitional justice processes, are all
simultaneous and interconnected ‘works in progress,’ there is a clear potential for
theoretical or policy-related inaccuracy. Specifically, we do not have the value of
hindsight for current, contemporary events, and so any analysis of CICIG and processes
currently taking place in Guatemala, may in fact turn out differently than what I
hypothesize. I accept that risk in the hopes that my theoretical construction and analysis
will provide a “net benefit” to theorists and policy-minded analysts alike. My theoretical
and/or policy-related arguments may turn out to be incomplete and/or require
correctives—in fact, I expect that they absolutely will. But my hope and expectation is
that my analysis provided will benefit future researchers on a level that outweighs the
explicit, the link between transitional justice and democracy is quite clear. See Kathryn Sikkink, “From
Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights,” Latin
American Politics and Society 50.1 (Spring 2008): 25.
60
Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice
Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” Human Rights Quarterly 32.4 (2010): 980-1007.
61
Isaacs, “Truth and the Challenge of Reconciliation,” 139.
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potential pitfalls. To offer an example of what I am referencing, Hudson and Taylor were
the first to attempt to theoretically account for CICIG as a hybrid criminal justice
mechanism, only two years into its mandate.62 In addition to describing it as a criminal
justice mechanism, they also describe it as a “unique hybrid structure,” and suggest that it
ought to be replicated in other settings. 63 My conclusions about the institution are
different than theirs on virtually all accounts. However, without their research and
theoretical constructs, most analysts, myself included, would have little to compare
CICIG to and few means by which to conceptualize the institution. Their analysis has
been invaluable in that I have been able to compare and contrast my own ideas about
theory and function against their own, and I have been able to arrive at different
conclusions. To explicate the lesson here, if analysts and researchers disagree with my
suppositions due to the ongoing and ever-changing nature of the peace, security, and
justice situation(s) in Guatemala, I hope that my research in this thesis will at least
illuminate and offer insight for other research programmes.

I.6 Organization and Main Arguments
The thesis at hand is modeled in a progressive fashion towards overall, policy-specific
recommendations, in contrast with other theses and monographs, which often use
chapters as separate parts of a comprehensive argument. To further expound, in the first
chapter, I make the case for the definition and application of procedural justice within the
lexicon of transitional justice. The second chapter then builds upon the first in attempting
to situate CICIG within transitional justice: I use the theoretical concepts discussed in the
first chapter to account for how CICIG has the potential to foster, at least on a theoretical
level, better transitional justice outcomes by imbuing the process with greater procedural
justice. The third and final analytical chapter is significantly longer than the preceding
two. While the first chapter develops theoretical constructs to better account for CICIG,
the second chapter uses those same constructs to situate CICIG both functionally and
institutionally within the greater context and lexicon of transitional justice concepts and
institutional arrangements. The third chapter then takes a turn towards policy, based on
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the theoretical and institutional placement discussed in the preceding two. The
comprehensive project, then, offers tangible lessons to be concurrently applied to CICIG
as it moves forward but also in other similar institutional arrangements, certainly in other
Latin American transitional justice processes, if not global ones.
In Chapter One, my main argument is as follows: The establishment of procedural
justice measures is an important step in securing trust and common purpose among
various factions of a given society, but especially one that is severely divided following
internecine conflict. In other words, procedural justice can be conceived of as the
measures which allow a society to break with the past, and concurrently establish a bright
new future. Further to that point, I argue that both temporality and responsiveness are the
vehicles by which procedural justice is operationalized, specifically within a transitional
justice context. I also use the first chapter to argue for greater recognition, greater
coordination, and a more sustained focus on procedural justice within transitional justice.
In fact, there are several analysts from the sub-field of transitional justice which make the
case for some form of procedural justice in their analyses. There are many more who
argue for some form of responsiveness or temporality within transitional justice processes
without explicitly recognizing that they are ostensibly arguing in favour of greater
procedural justice. In short, I am calling for a more sustained discussion on the role of
procedural justice within transitional justice while concurrently shining a requisite light
on that emerging strand of transitional justice literature.
In Chapter Two, I make two main arguments as to how CICIG fits into the
transitional justice mold of institutions and functions: First, relative to transitional justice
functions, CICIG directly affects trust, which then affects acknowledgment, which both in
turn affect retribution. Together, all three functions signal a break with the past, a
primary goal of procedural justice as I define it in Chapter One. Moreover, in connecting
procedural justice to the transitional justice functions of truth, acknowledgment, and
retribution, I argue that trust and acknowledgment have a symbiotic relationship in how
they render CICIG to be something of a ‘follow-up’ truth commission, a rejoinder to
Guatemala’s two significant truth commissions from the late 1990s: The UN-Guatemalan
state joint-commissioned Historical Clarification Commission (“CEH”) and the Catholic
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Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory Project (“REMHI”). 64 In that ‘follow-up’
function, I argue that trust and acknowledgment combine to introduce a measure of
greater temporality into Guatemala’s long-stalled transitional justice process. Meanwhile,
I also argue that largely through CICIG’s truth recovery and investigative functions, the
state is compelled to acknowledge past wrongdoing during and since Guatemala’s civil
conflict, a long absent recognition in Guatemala’s transitional justice process subsequent
to the 1996 peace accords. In establishing the truth and acknowledgment of wrongdoing,
then, in addition to the heft that legalistic and retributive visions of transitional justice
still command, 65 CICIG has thus prompted Guatemala to enact various measures of
retributive action relative to human rights abuses during and since its bloody civil war.
Also in Chapter Two, I argue against the predominant understanding of CICIG as
a “unique hybrid organization.”66 In fact, in analyzing several other transitional justice
institutions in Latin America, I find that it shares a lot of functional and institutional
similarities to El Salvador’s Truth Commission from the early 1990s. My aim in
institutionally demystifying CICIG and locating its similarities among other transitional
justice institutions is to essentially render it more of an instructive, insight-bearing
institution for future analysts and policymakers to build off of. Of course, CICIG is not
uniformly similar to El Salvador’s truth commission (“CTES”). But its similarities far
outweigh its differences, so its affected outcomes can be more easily compared and
contrasted in order to gain deeper insight into the future desirability and/or deeper
understanding of its causal function.
The final analytical chapter, Chapter Three, contains two micro-theses much like
the second chapter. The aim of the third chapter is to analyze CICIG’s successes and
drawbacks. As such, I deemed it necessary to compare CICIG against its mandate and
then to compare it against the previously discussed functions that it has the capacity to
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affect—truth, acknowledgment, and retribution. In this final chapter, I shift my analytical
lens from that of theory to policy application. Thus, relative to CICIG’s mandate, I argue
that the mandate itself was too ambitious in the first place for CICIG to be reasonably
expected to adequately fulfill it. There are three parts to the mandate: To investigate illicit
and clandestine security organizations and uncover their structures; to assist the state in
disbanding such groups through investigation and punishment of their crimes; and to
make policy recommendations to eliminate and prevent the re-emergence of the
aforementioned groups.67 CICIG has been successful at investigating, uncovering, and
purging the state apparatus of corruption to a significant degree. However, on the other
hand, CICIG’s mandatory strategy of prosecution as a means of disbanding illicit groups
in Guatemala is limited in its efficacy and has proven to be unsustainable over the long
term: Its prosecution strategy has not secured institutional requirements nor capacities to
continue the work that CICIG has started once the institution’s mandate eventually runs
its course.
I then make three ‘takeaway’ arguments relative to the successes and failures
CICIG relative to its transitional justice functions of truth recovery, acknowledgment,
and retributive actions. Related to truth, I argue that Guatemala needs greater
institutional-, cultural-, and capacity-related sustainability built into its justice and
security sectors in order to prevent a backslide in the prosecutorial successes that CICIG
has helped to secure. Otherwise, it runs the risk of rendering itself a truth recoveryfocused institution with little ability to use such truth to affect meaningful justice, either
restorative or retributive, for Guatemala’s myriad of victims of human rights violations.
Related to acknowledgment, I make the case that CICIG and/or the Guatemalan justice
sector need to better connect their justice-seeking actions to the victims for whom they
are largely trying to affect justice. To illustrate this point, while much of Guatemala’s
urban middle class has been inspired and encouraged by the shift in the country’s ethos
impunity-countering ethos,68 the most afflicted victims of state intransigence and human
67

“Mandate: Agreement to Establish CICIG,” CICIG: International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala, December 12, 2006, accessed March 3, 2015; available from
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rights violations are Mayan-Indigenous populations. This population is generally distant
and removed from educated, urban sectors which have directly observed CICIG’s impact
and the shift in justice outcomes within the country over CICIG’s tenure. Finally, relative
to retribution, I argue that a transnational strategy aimed at both supply and demand of
illicit goods being trafficked by transnational organized crime in Latin America is
required for any tangible, long-term success to be experienced by institutions such as
CICIG. This, in fact, is the most important conclusion that I draw from my analysis of
CICIG’s successes and drawbacks within its transitional justice-affecting capacities.
The initial plan for this thesis was to analyze CICIG as a transitional justice
institution in the hopes of analyzing whether it would be a desirable or even useful
institutional model to apply in the context of another Latin American state’s transitional
justice process. I come to the conclusion that, given the limited nature of aid and
development resources in addition to the growing transnational criminal network size and
strength within Latin America, a more robust address to the supply and demand side of
illicit goods, especially drugs, ought to be the immediate priority. Without such an
address, transnational criminal networks have the capacity to evolve and shift their
operations bases so as to avoid law enforcement while simultaneously fomenting
insecurity, violence, and injustice. A sub-international address does not have the
jurisdiction nor the resources to compete against such a powerful but also amorphous
entity.

her ties to the alleged ringleader of a border customs fraud ring. See Elizabeth Malkin, “Wave of Protests
Spreads to Scandal-Weary Honduras and Guatemala,” The New York Times, June 12, 2015, accessed June
21, 2015; available from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/americas/corruption-scandals-drivingprotests-in-guatemala-and-honduras.html?_r=0.

21

1. CHAPTER ONE:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A MEANS OF ENRICHING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
PROCESSES
1.1 Overview
Within transitional justice literature, there has been an increasing call amongst theorists
and practitioners to map out the “key steps in peacebuilding that [need] to be taken to
secure a stable democratic future.”

1

These “key steps” generally follow some

conventional mixture of Martha Minow’s seminal delineation of retributive, restorative,
and reparative forms of justice, now a virtual ‘trinity’ in transitional justice literature.2
Various scholars are now attempting to carve out normative pathways of transitional
justice measures to optimally achieve a definitive resolution of conflict and
simultaneously embark upon a post-conflict, generally democratically-conceived era of
peace, justice, and good governance. Moreover, some of the most cogent and articulate
prescriptions of optimal transitional justice conditions are being crafted by giants in the
field of transitional justice, such as Kathryn Sikkink,3 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri;4
1

Clara Sandoval Villalba, “Transitional Justice: Key Concepts, Processes, and Challenges,” (Institute for
Democracy and Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper, August 2011) accessed 24 February 2015; available
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or alternatively, authors who are rapidly becoming virtual “must cites” of the transitional
justice arena, largely due to their robust work in the prescriptive realm.5
The purpose of this chapter, and this thesis in general, is not to refute or rebut the
dominant paradigms and trajectories of transitional justice. 6 Rather, I am using this
chapter in an effort to contribute to a “deeper, broader, [and] longer” transitional justice.7
The main aim of this thesis, then, is to situate the International Commission Against
Impunity in Guatemala (“CICIG”), and the issues which it aims to address, within the
larger scope of transitional justice. 8 Christian Nadeau has written an instructive
epistemological rejoinder in his consideration of transitional justice as a field: “Theory
should not be imposed on the reality it intends to grasp, but be inspired by that reality.”9
Indeed, without some requisite theoretical consideration and supplementation to this end,
any such endeavour to both locate and explain CICIG within transitional justice would be
incomplete in both analytical and explanatory rhetoric and logic. In other words, rather
than ‘shoe-horning’ theory onto a concept, 10 I am heeding Nadeau’s proscription to
deepen and broaden the theoretical bases within the field to better account for CICIG and
its role relative to transitional justice. Thus, in this chapter, I seek to add-on to or fill in
the blanks for what I see as under-theorized pieces within transitional justice’s constituent
elements of retributive, restorative, and reparative justice(s), but especially within the
liminal spaces of overlap between each of these types of justice. I am seeking to both
refine a definition of and make the case for inclusion of procedural justice within the
vocabulary of transitional justice.

4
Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice,” International Security 28.3 (Winter 2004): 5-44.
5
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Western Ontario, 2014)..
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1.2 Introduction
While many analysts in the transitional justice field argue for greater proscriptive,
utilitarian theory so as to streamline transitional justice practices, there is still a
significant pushback against such trends. Rachel Sieder, for example, argues eloquently
for an account of historical and social contingencies, rather than “reducing [justice]
simply to a set of institutions.”11 This is arguably what transitional justice literature is
guilty of doing when scholars advocate “best practices” models. Guatemala is indeed
interesting because it has combined various schemas and models of transitional justice
from truth commissions to reparations to prosecutions to amnesties. Yet for much of the
past twenty years of post-civil war existence, the country has been plagued by a spiraling
crime rate in Guatemala and near-complete impunity for perpetrators of crimes and
human rights abuses alike.12 Such impunity is a contemporary hallmark of Guatemala,
but also a relic of a ghastly civil war where the state carried out “acts of genocide”
against Mayan-Indigenous populations.13 Thus, in Guatemala, one can readily see that
while “best practices” theories may outline useful approaches to transitional justice, they
are at best imperfect in their proscriptive capacity. They speak better to what works best
on average, and perhaps offer a useful general approach to transitional justice—but when
discussing post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, and the transition from violence to
peace, generalities are less than optimal.
The driving question in my consideration of procedural justice in the context of
the larger transitional justice setting is this: Why and where do dominant transitional
justice theories fail to account for the disappointing failures of transitional justice
processes in places like Guatemala. I propose that transitional justice, as an academic
discipline, has a significant dearth in theorized temporality and theorized responsiveness
relative to its institutional and practical frameworks. Certain examples of largely
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completed transitional justice processes, such as Argentina or Chile, 14 suggest that
transitional justice can succeed without a deepened theorization of the field of
transitional justice literature. However, as Chandra Lekha Sriram has noted, transitional
justice mechanisms and processes may also be both destabilizing and, indeed,
“inappropriate for the political and legal cultures in which they are set up.”15 Thus, I use
this chapter to make the argument that combined, temporality and responsiveness are the
key vehicles behind the realization of procedural justice. Moreover, I believe that
procedural justice, as a practice and a consideration, ought to become more integral to
the practice of transitional justice. Essentially, the institutions and processes of
transitional justice are not enough to either produce or predict a positive justice-related
outcome. Rather, the consideration of time and temporality within the framework of
transitional justice in addition to the consideration of responsiveness to and input from
the majority of players in any transitional justice-affected society ought to combine to
both lengthen and deepen transitional justice. Though procedural justice itself cannot
assure the success of transitional justice processes, as cases like Argentina and Chile
generally attest, it is virtually always missing in places where transitional justice
mechanisms are met with failure. With the inclusion of procedural justice into the
transitional justice lexicon, I argue that justice outcomes will be consistently and
systematically improved, as will be the prospects for reconciliation and the prevention of
future violence and human rights violations.

1.3 Procedural and Transitional Justice: Overlap but Lack of Recognition
A large problem with procedural justice as a concept is the various ways in which it is
used, discussed, and theorized. For example, two of the most prominent theorists of
procedural justice, John Rawls and Tom R. Tyler, come at the topic from a legalistphilosophical and social psychological perspective, respectively. They often talk right
14
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past one another, or talk about completely separate spheres of applicability. That is,
Tyler, for example, is talking about group behaviour, while Rawls is discussing the
foundations for a functional society. Ultimately, while they are perhaps speaking to
different situations and different audiences, at a general level, each of their conceptions
of procedural justice is not fundamentally incompatible with the other. Moreover, the
rather small amount of literature concerning procedural justice within transitional justice
is largely compatible with the theories of Tyler and Rawls as well. Thus, it seems that a
more robust description and theorization of procedural justice within transitional justice
is required—a task upon which I am partly embarking upon to remedy.
Procedural justice has several meanings. There is a significant literature
concerning the actual procedures in various mechanisms in the transitional justice canon,
but this is not generally what I am specifically trying to define and apply.16 A great deal
of transitional justice scholars touch upon topics which I argue, and believe that both
Rawls and Tyler would likely agree, fall into the realm of procedural justice without
necessarily realizing and certainly not acknowledging it. Lundy and McGovern, for
example, talk about “justice from the bottom up.”17 Kieran McEvoy likewise discusses
how transitional justice needs to move beyond legalism and “countenance the role of
other [non-legal] actors and forms of knowledge.”18 Each author is directly arguing for
greater responsiveness from transitional justice processes, a core tenet of what I
subsequently define as one of two major vehicles behind actualizing procedural justice.
But neither article discusses the notion of procedural justice directly, nor do they refer to
any discernible procedural justice theorists.
Similar to how certain authors have discussed responsiveness without making the
connection to procedural justice, writ-large, other analysts argue in favour of greater
temporal considerations within transitional justice mechanisms. Aguilar estimates that
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impunity for perpetrators of human rights in Spain dating back to its Franco dictatorship
era resulted precisely because transitional justice mechanisms and even the national
narrative about the conflict did not include any considerations of temporality: “There is
no agreement over the past,” let alone the mechanisms to deal with it. 19 Jennifer J.
Llewellyn also references timeframe and temporality in her estimation that the lens of
transitional justice is limiting because it views truth-telling mechanisms as less important
in “transitional” periods. By only focusing on the near future, its long-term role in
establishing the bedrock for “modeling justice for the future society” is limited.20 Yet,
once more, neither Llewellyn nor Aguilar broach the topic of procedural justice directly,
despite discussing the importance of temporality—what I argue is a vital piece relative to
procedural justice.

1.4 Theorizing a Role for Procedural Justice in Transitional Justice
Literature
One issue concerning the topic of procedural justice vis-à-vis transitional justice is that it
is under-theorized and often unrecognizable.21 The subsequent pages aim to change that.
But procedural justice as a theme, or at least a potential theme, within the transitional
justice literature, is a topic that is slowly being brought up: James L. Gibson,22 Monika
Nalepa,23 Bernadette Atuahene,24 and various others have touched on the issue. Hancock
and Pearson d’Estrée,25 and especially Nickson and Braithwaite,26 argue the most robust
and well-considered delineation of procedural justice within a transitional justice
context. As such, I draw most heavily upon their contributions out of the few scholars
19
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looking at procedural justice through the lens of transitional justice. Namely, as Nickson
and Braithwaite explicitly discuss, “deepening justice” means greater bottom-up citizenbased opportunities to inject more responsiveness into justice mechanisms.
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“Lengthening justice” means opening up time frames for justice so as to suit victims
rather than donors, for example. 28 Where my theoretical underpinnings diverge from
Nickson and Braithwaite, however, is that they view this kind of procedural justice as a
means of enacting more realistic expectations for what transitional justice can accomplish
and so that more survivors/victims can experience some justice.29 I think that the greater
value in procedural justice lies in its capacity for signaling a new future, based on
fairness, in a break with a profoundly unfair past. Until that basis for trust has been
firmly built and cemented in place, justice in whatever forms it takes will be viewed with
skepticism and failure.
However, in using Nickson and Braithwaite as a kind of guideline for creating a
deeper and longer procedural justice within the paradigm of transitional justice, I have
found that their reasoning and goals behind such a vision of transitional justice are also
perhaps misdirected. While I think that their conception of procedural justice as a means
of assuring some justice for a greater number of victims/survivors is a relevant concern, I
think that procedural justice can and should play a more fundamental role in directing
post-conflict reconstruction. Rather than merely positing a parcel of justice into a larger
programme of transitional justice, I think that procedural justice ought to be a major
guiding ethos which supports and guides the larger goals of transitional justice.
Thus, in my search to include a greater measure procedural justice within
transitional justice, I turned to procedural justice theorists outside of the field of
transitional justice: John Rawls and Tom R. Tyler. Notably, Tyler argues that there are
four components of procedural justice that influence individuals’ perceptions of fairness:
“opportunities for participation;” “neutrality of the forum;” “trustworthiness of the
authorities;” and “treatment with dignity and respect.”30 Moreover, Tyler and Blader have
found that “fair procedures [are] an antecedent of the type of group culture that is
27
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facilitative of positive group attitudes and internalized values.”31 Of final relevance, Tyler
also contends that individuals pay more attention to outcomes over procedural fairness
when resolving a dispute with someone outside of their social group and/or class.32
John Rawls, for his part, argues that people are rational actors largely because
mutual constraints create an atmosphere which generally compels actors to act rationally
and reasonably, 33 at least in political, social, and economic realms. 34 In other words,
“justice as fairness,” as Rawls titles it, views society as “an undertaking among
[individuals] in the light of what they regard as their mutual advantage.”35 Importantly,
Rawls was one of the first thinkers to view justice, or at least parts of it, as proceduredependent, rather than predicated solely on the basis of substantive outcomes. Tyler’s
subsequent research has clarified that indeed, individuals can and usually do demarcate a
difference between procedures and outcomes.36 According to Rawls, then, justice cannot
be conceptualized outside of procedural fairness: All justice is predicated on procedural
justice. Rawls ostensibly argues that justice is deeply related to fairness in the sense that
grave injustices, inequality, and unfair happenstances can take place. Importantly,
however, “justice as fairness” signifies the potential to arrange, regulate, and change
situations of extant injustice.37 In Rawls’ own words, “justice as fairness” views society
as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”38 He further suggests that individuals in
31
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a society begin at some agreeable point as a necessary condition for justice. According to
Rawlsian logic, then, because those at a disadvantage in such a society no longer gain
anything by being a part of that society, it would then be irrational to continue on through
the status quo. But following the breakdown of a society into violence and grave human
rights abuses, as has often occurred in societies engaged in transitional justice processes,
the question then becomes how to even bring those individuals back together, let alone
establish the basic tenets of a conversation, let alone the create the basis for trust and
cooperation. What is unclear is how society can return to its state of trust and cooperation
that undergird the societal order. Without trust and cooperation, the potential for violence
and conflict still exists, but any attempt to achieve justice is likely to also be looked upon
as illegitimate or at least questionable.
Tyler ostensibly argues that group cooperation is predicated predominantly on fair
procedure, which then facilitates affinitive attitudes and the development of shared,
common values. However, such attitudes and values are blocked from becoming
entrenched when social groups and class become salient combative factors in any given
society. In such divided societies, justice outcomes then become more important than
procedural fairness. By firmly establishing (or re-establishing) Tyler’s four components
of procedural justice,39 a society can regain a “group culture that is facilitative of positive
group attitudes and internalized values,”40 and Rawls’ vision of society characterized by
“justice as fairness” can once again take hold. Moreover, Tyler and Blader hold that
perceptions of procedural justice regularly influence individual attitudes and behaviour
more than their determination of person self-interest.41 Rawls’ conception of “justice as
fairness” is, thus, confirmed through Tyler and Blader’s empirical examination of
procedural justice, but its foundations are strengthened: Not only are individuals tied to
their “kernel of overlapping consensus”—the basis for societal cohesion—through
rational calculations of self-interest, they are further tied to it through perceptions of
fairness and just procedure, as Tyler and Blader hold. 42
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1.5 Practical Interaction Between Procedural and Transitional Justice
One final area that requires explaining is how and where the concepts of temporality and
responsiveness fit into the web of theory that I have explained above. I have thus far
argued that Tyler’s four components of procedural justice—voice; neutrality;
trustworthiness of authority; and treatment with dignity and respect—serve as a bedrock
of sorts for the whole project of re-establishing the foundations for a healthy societal trust
and interaction.43 As such, these four integral elements of procedural justice are a useful
place to link up with temporality and responsiveness. In doing so, I think that transitional
justice as a field can be more deeply theorized to include procedural justice within its
mechanisms and frameworks. The reason for this, as I discussed above, is that a great
deal of literature implicitly argues for increased consideration of one or both of
temporality and responsiveness in transitional justice processes.
The following section takes Tyler’s four key factors of procedural justice and
contrasts them against certain failures or challenges faced in transitional justice processes
in Guatemala and elsewhere around the globe. To that end, Pearson and d’Estrée have
also analyzed Tyler’s four components of procedural justice with an eye towards
transitional justice. Specifically, they argue for a greater attentiveness to local needs, and
a shift away from the dominant paradigms of transitional justice, which has historically
been more inclined to suggest or even dictate post-conflict justice processes from the top
down.44
While a stronger focus on local culture is certainly a necessary function of
procedural justice, I am looking to narrow that focus even more to include temporality
and responsiveness as the mechanisms by which localized individuals, groups, and
cultures can be best engaged. To that end, I am using Guatemalan case studies
consistently through my exploration of each of Tyler’s four components of procedural
justice because the (part of the) next chapter will be looking to locate CICIG as an
institution within transitional justice theory. I am adding other case studies so as to show
that the failure to consider temporality and responsiveness, two of the key variables of
procedural justice, is a problem currently facing transitional justice programs regardless

43
44

Tyler, “Social Justice,” 121.
Hancock and d’Estrée, “Culture and Procedural Justice in Transitioning Societies,” 131.

31

of the geographical setting. In other words, a weak consideration of temporality and
responsiveness within transitional justice programmes is by no means exclusive to
Guatemala. Additionally, I will be alternating temporality and responsiveness for each of
Tyler’s four components of procedural justice between the Guatemalan and outside case
studies. For example, for the component of participation, I will be analyzing Guatemala
as a case study and responsiveness, meanwhile I will be considering South Africa as a
case study and temporality. I will then subsequently switch back and forth between
country case studies as well as responsiveness and temporality for each of Tyler’s four
component parts of procedural justice. In sum, my hope is to show how a lack of
responsiveness and temporality built into transitional justice programmes is a systemic
problem which plaguing these programmes in virtually whichever setting they exist.
Put another way, the aim of my investigation is to show a consistent pattern of
how a failure to establish procedural justice mechanisms prior to embarking on
transitional justice processes has hampered or foiled efforts to effect productive
transitional justice advances. Alternatively, sometimes the inclusion of procedural justice
mechanisms can be shown to greatly enhance the transitional justice processes and
mechanisms at play. I aim to show that either responsiveness or temporality can be
directly observed in either the successes or failures of these case studies. I am not looking
to definitively prove that procedural justice is vital for all successful transitional justice
processes. Nor am I looking to present an extremely robust account of exactly how
procedural justice should engage in all transitional justice processes. My intentions are
actually quite humble: I aim to argue persuasively that transitional justice could benefit a
great deal from considerations relevant to procedural justice: temporality and
responsiveness.
Finally, a caveat is necessary before investigating each of Tyler’s four requisite
components of procedural justice. All four are deeply interrelated. So for example, the a
survivor/victim being given voice through an interview could also, perhaps even likely,
experience not only an opportunity for participation but also feel as though he/she is
being treated with dignity and respect. If anything, overlap amongst these four
components, and the two added elements of temporality and responsiveness, only
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strengthens the case for an increase in procedural justice considerations within
transitional justice theory and mechanisms.

1.5a Voice
The purpose of the Commission for Historical Clarification (“CEH”) in Guatemala was
to investigate all of the human rights violations which took place during the civil war.45
To do so, many non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) were required to assist the
effort in collecting testimonies for the CEH. 46 However, with an eye towards both
participation and responsiveness, some observers have argued that a lack of both training
and sensitivity to local customs, cultural rights, and the experience of group-based harm
on behalf of NGO staff and volunteers severely hampered the process. 47 Lieselotte
Viaene has also commented how this broad approach to the CEH population surveys
failed to explore deeper cultural logics which contain needs, perceptions, and attitudes of
the Indigenous-Mayan populations. 48 As such, while the participation of MayanIndigenous populations was certainly of use to the CEH and its findings, the interviews
likely could have been more revealing if interviewers were more generally attuned to
cultural particularities and needs. Here, it is important to remember that, “people define
fair treatment in terms of the quality of their social relationship with others in the
group.”49 Among Mayan-Indigenous populations, there was huge demand for mass grave
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exhumations as a means of establishing closure and remembrance.50 But the CEH and
other ‘justice practitioners’ in the immediate post-war period were ignorant, or at least
dismissive, of these concerns. It is easy, then, to see why significant Mayan-Indigenous
populations felt as though they were only participating on the terms of the CEH with little
responsiveness relative to their concerns and conceptions of justice.
Switching over to issues of land restitution in South Africa, Bernadette Atuahene
has argued that input, or responsiveness, was generally insufficient when dealing with
transitional justice measures such as land restitution. To that end, she advances the notion
of the importance of “sustained conversation.” 51 She argues that the capacity for
commission officials to sustain communication lines with claimants throughout the
entire, somewhat arduous, process was the one major variable that “deeply affected
whether they believed that the restitution process was fair.”52 People feel empowered as
citizens when they feel that the state is listening to their voice—they feel as though
justice is being “done.” But such a process of communication is an ongoing one, not a
‘one-off,’ as Atuahene illustrates. Moreover, Nickson and Braithwaite, also speaking
from a South African perspective, have argued that the lengthening of transitional justice
could resemble measures like keeping the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”)
open over a longer period. Indeed, as they point out, many victims/survivors are not
ready to speak in the immediate aftermath of the traumas they have experienced. 53
Braithwaite has also noted the value of sustained conversation in the development of
civic trust,54 which speaks both to Atuahene’s point directly, and also to the secondary
value of lengthening the time frame of truth commissions to collect testimony: The
societal conversation regarding the past stays on the table for a longer period of time; has
the potential to become more deeply institutionalized; and can often contribute to the
development of greater civic trust. Thus, when considering the importance of ‘voice’ to
procedural justice, considerations of temporality are valuable in that they give that voice
a more robust, institutionalized, and ultimately fair expression.
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1.5b Neutrality
The neutrality of the state as an arbiter of justice in Guatemala—or its lack of
neutrality—has historically been and currently still is deeply compromised by its record
of futility. 55 Compounding the matter is that not only is the system weak, the vast
majority of the Guatemalan public views the justice system as favouring the country’s
wealthy and powerful elite.56 Indeed, only six percent of Guatemalans in 2000 thought
that their “basic rights” were protected by the legal system.57 Apathy over the situation’s
unchanging and deep historic roots, as well as the fear of violence and insecurity amongst
both Indigenous-Mayan and lower class populations both serve as barriers to activism
and change driven from “bottom-up” processes.58 Finally, due to social insecurity and the
unresponsiveness of the official justice system, extra-judicial violence amongst all classes
in society is viewed as a legitimate recourse to justice. 59 The long-standing lack of
neutrality of the Guatemalan state’s justice system, particularly its favoured approach of
impunity for the rich and powerful, has deeply undermined the rule of law in Guatemala.
But one cannot separate popular perception of a non-neutral state in matters of justice
with the long-standing application of the law to favour only the country’s elites. Extrajudicial, “highly punitive forms of justice” are thus viewed as legitimate by large swathes
of the Guatemalan population.60 Such vigilante responses undermine the foundations and
trust for the rule of law even further than the temporally long-standing entrenchment of
“justice by and for elites.”
In Northern Ireland, following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement between British
Royalists and Irish Republicans to cease violent conflict,61 there has been a dearth of
discussion and acknowledgement of what the Irish euphemistically call “the Troubles.”
The British government sought out to change that in the mid-2000s by commissioning the
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Northern Ireland Consultative Group on the Past (“CG”). Its basic mission was to
develop “public strategies for confronting the most controversial actions of the
Troubles.”62 Essentially, the British government wanted to bring together governments
and civil society in order to address the past—to initiate a process of transitional justice,
or at least a national dialogue. Hancock highlights how the Consultative Group was seen
as less-than-neutral from the start, at least through the eyes of Irish republicans, given its
provenance as an institutional response to “the Troubles” emanating from the British
government.63 To compound the matter, “no actual victims or relatives of victims [were]
on the panel, and those who were on the panel were chosen by the British government.”64
Thus, the Consultative Group was neither neutral, nor was it responsive to broad
concerns. Even after regular media and public criticism of CG and a vociferous rebuttal
against its British-centric establishment by Irish republican political party Sinn Fein,65 the
Consultative Group continued on in its mandate and activities with little consideration
towards responsiveness and accountability to the Irish and Northern Irish public and their
concerns. That is, nothing more than an indignant op-ed by the Chairs of the CG in the
Belfast Telegraph claiming both independence and distance from the British government
which commissioned the CG in the first place.66 Indeed, the CG could not overcome its
unpopularity, especially the unpopularity of its subsequently proposed reparations
payments. As Tyler has argued, authority viewed as legitimate is likely to be obeyed, and
likewise, “when people regard authorities as less legitimate, they are less willing to defer
to their decisions because those decisions because those decisions are fairly made.”67 In
the case of the CG, its perceived lack of neutrality, aggravated by its inadequate
responsiveness to both victims groups and republican concerns torpedoed its legitimacy
in the eyes of many—enough so that the entirety of its recommendations were tabled and
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a dialogue about “the Troubles”, let alone substantive justice, continues to be elusive in
Ireland and Northern Ireland alike.

1.5c Trustworthiness of Authority
Tyler describes ‘trustworthiness of authority’ to be judged as “whether or not that
[authority] is benevolent and caring, is concerned about their situation and their concerns
and needs, considers their arguments, tries to do what is right for them, and tries to be
fair.” 68 Over the long term, the Guatemalan state has reneged on all of these
aforementioned qualities of trustworthiness to the vast majority of its population. Two
particular issues illustrate the temporally-related lack of trust for authority in Guatemala:
First, as both the CEH findings found,69 and were later affirmed in the verdict of exPresident Efrain Rios Montt’s domestic genocide trial, significant Mayan-Indigenous
communities were exposed to genocide and ‘delitos contra los deberes de humanidad’ in
1982 and 1983.70 However, only after the publication of the CEH report Never Again:
Memory of Silence in 1999 did the Guatemalan military offer a muted apology
accompanied by a concomitant denial of responsibility. According to Anita Isaacs,
“Guatemalan truth commissions failed to secure either official acknowledgement to enact
the reparations called for.”71 A second prescient issue is summarized by Nicola Short’s
observation that the socio-economic agreement as part of the peace accords was almost
exclusively based on neoliberal principles of structural adjustments and extensive
privatization of state assets.72 Yet, despite these reforms, the economic growth rate in
Guatemala since the peace accords, up until 2007, was the lowest in all of Latin
America.73 Moreover, between 2000 and 2006, Guatemala’s working classes, Indigenous
and Ladino alike, “suffered a dramatic increase in the number of workers paid below the
minimum wage.” 74 From the perspective of trustworthiness, as defined by Tyler, the
68
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Guatemalan state has shown very little benevolence, caring, concern, or fairness. Had this
lack of consideration, especially of Indigenous-Mayan communities, seen timely remedy
or at least some kind of acknowledgement and response, the state could have at least
maintained some level of trustworthiness in the eyes of its Indigenous-Mayan population.
But when viewed over the long-term in a temporality-focused lens, the state has
consistently evaded responsibility for justice and accountability to its poor and
Indigenous populations, and little inclination to change that state of affairs at its own
behest.75
Guillermo O’Donnell has noted that unlawful advantages for public officials and
“unlawful encroachment by one state institution upon the proper authority of another” are
two key problems related to a lack of trust in a democratic regime.76 In extrapolating this
principle to justice at a more general level, it is precisely for these reasons that
responsiveness is so central to trustworthiness: Individuals intimately involved in the
process of justice can first-hand see that nobody is receiving undue advantage.
Meanwhile, they are also, in effect, party to their own justice-related destiny—the
invisible processes of statecraft are reduced.77
In Rwanda, for example, Hancock and Pearson d’Estrée have noted how many
players in the international community, such as Amnesty International, have argued that
Rwanda’s gacaca court system is illegitimate and highly problematic. 78 Hancock and
Pearson d’Estree argue for a more local approach to justice, though. While gacaca may
not resonate with certain international practitioners of justice and their terms of
acceptability, its ‘contextual competence’ in being able to “fit” into familiar models of
justice in local communities renders it most appropriate precisely because it is responsive
to local needs and concerns. Moreover, against the criticism of certain failed gacaca
processes, Phil Clark has been quick to point out that, once more, responsiveness is the
key variable at play: Where gacaca has failed, its judges have failed in their capacity as
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arbiters responding to local concerns.79 Thus, the localized process of justice inherent in
gacaca has created a transparency of the process of justice and has also included the
individuals most affected by and in need of justice.

1.5d Treatment with Dignity and Respect
The national discussion and treatment of “victims” of the Guatemalan civil war is highly
divisive and still relevant today. Tyler argues that members of any given society are
“very concerned” that their dignity and membership within that society is “recognized
and acknowledged.”80 Guatemala, from the perspective of the state, has failed on both
counts as one can readily see through the administration of reparations payments to
victims. Many Indigenous-Mayan peasants were forced, under the threat of violence, to
participate in civil/paramilitary patrols (“PACs”) in looking for guerillas and subversives
on behalf of the Guatemalan military.81 Only through constant lobbying and an eventual
mass demonstration, which blocked an important national airport in 2002, did former
PACs finally receive reparations payments.82 Victims and former refugees still had not
been paid reparations payments by that time, however. Despite the pressure to initiate a
reparations payment program for those victims and a strong recommendation to do so by
the CEH in 1999, a “lack of political will” postponed the initialization of their reparations
programme (“PNR”) from 2003 until 2005.83 Related to reparations, Isaacs has noted that
the social fabric of much of rural Guatemala is deeply divided between ex-PACs,
disbanded guerillas and military, as well as victims and former refugees and displaced
persons (“DPs”) often living as neighbours. 84 The reparations payment programs and
their uneven, unequal, and inconsistent administration to many of these individuals and
communities is often a source of bitter resentment. Viaene’s comment regarding expatrols is especially prescient here: “ex-PACs [regularly] expressed their gratitude that
79
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someone was finally listening to them.”85 Indeed, the state’s constant postponement of
reparations payments, and blindness to specific needs and demands relative to the
administration of reparations payments has undermined “the fragile process of rebuilding
community trust” in Guatemala.86 The state’s reparations regimen has been anything but
responsive.
The timely restoration of dignity following atrocity can ultimately lead to strong
justice-related outcomes, as the Argentinian experience would attest. Monika Nalepa has
opined that, relative to transitional justice policies, justice-focused institutions “should be
designed so as to maximize their citizens’ perceptions of fairness.”87 Tyler and Blader
have offered a postulate that recognition and acknowledgement are vital for a process to
be considered fair.88 In attempting to acknowledge and maximize citizen perceptions of
fairness, timeliness must undoubtedly be considered important to those ends. In fact,
Emilio Crenzel, in reflecting on the Argentinian truth commission (“CONADEP”), has
argued that the rapid establishment of a collective public truth as soon as possible after
atrocities were committed was vital to CONADEP’s success. 89 The link between
temporality and dignity is perhaps not fully obvious, though: In the aftermath of
systematic human rights abuses, a rapid restoration of those rights and acknowledgement
of the suffering associated has the potential to effectively restore trust and common cause
within a society and/or state.
Argentina is a prime example of a rapid response to post-atrocity restorative
justice: CONADEP, Argentina’s truth commission, was commissioned in 1983 by the
late Argentinian President Raul Alfonsín. 90 This truth commission was established
immediately following the end of a military rule synonymous with enforced
disappearances and massive human rights abuses. In fact, CONADEP was born directly
out of response to Argentine human rights groups calling for justice, 91 such as Las
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Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, which consistently demanded “verdad, justicia, y
memoria.”92 The ultimate success of CONADEP lies in how it both acknowledged and
affirmed the importance of engagement with victims and the families of victims who had
seen their rights violated so egregiously—it restored their dignity.93 Moreover, Sikkink
speaks about the importance of establishing a “right to truth” for victims.94 The very
notion of a “right to truth” asserts a victim-focused approach to justice, while implicitly
recognizing, acknowledging, and reaffirming the dignity and primacy of the individual
within the state. Because Argentina was able to rapidly re-certify the rights and dignity of
its citizens, it avoided a long-term reified entrenchment of injustice due to neglect and
lack of interest in the political realm. In short, temporality was intrinsically linked to
CONADEP’s success in reaffirming respect and dignity to Argentina’s victims.

1.6 Conclusion
At this point, I would like to trace exactly how responsiveness and temporality relate
back to procedural justice in general, but also how each of these concepts relate back to
transitional justice. In order to repair a ‘broken,’ post-conflict society must return back to
a Rawlsian vision of society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” 95 Tyler’s
four components of procedural justice—voice; neutrality; trustworthiness of authority;
and treatment with dignity and respect—serve as the bedrock by which mutual trust and
goodwill can be established. 96 Of course, without mutual trust and goodwill, if not
outright respect, various individuals and groups in a society have no common cause or
reason to come together in such a “cooperative venture,” and societies continue on
‘broken’ and lacking in all forms of justice. My analysis of various case studies was
designed to show how temporality and responsiveness serve as the vehicles by which
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Tyler’s four components of procedural justice are either realized or, alternatively, by
which they experience failure.
I want to remind the reader once more, however, that I am attempting to offer a
humble account of how transitional justice processes can be enhanced and improved. By
no means do I claim that a more focused lens towards temporality or responsiveness is a
simple solution for every problem encountered by transitional justice practices. Nor am I
trying to suggest that every “successful” case of transitional justice processes has
experienced robust procedural justice elements. What I am suggesting, however, is that
failed transitional justice processes lack at least one of temporality or responsiveness in
their implementation. More generally, I am arguing that a failure to include procedural
justice elements within transitional justice processes increases the likelihood that such
measures will fail, or at least encounter significant problems to overcome. Finally,
relating to the larger thesis here, I envision CICIG’s role in Guatemala serving, among
other elements, a large role relative to procedural justice. As such, I needed to theorize
and account for procedural justice in a much more robust way than it had been applied, in
my opinion, within transitional justice theory to date.97
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2. CHAPTER TWO:
LOCATING CICIG IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
FUNCTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

2.1 Background
This chapter aims to situate the International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala (“CICIG”) within existing concepts and literatures of transitional justice.
These concepts include procedural justice as an important component to such an
understanding. Thus, the prior chapter provides the necessary conceptual bases to justify
the inclusion of procedural justice within the transitional justice sphere of academia.
Now, the task is to explain how and where CICIG applies to transitional justice. Such a
connection is not immediately evident, as CICIG was born out of an intense post-conflict
wave of crime and violence—not directly nor evidently related to Guatemala’s civil war
or its post-conflict reconstruction era. Thus, one must first understand how CICIG can be
linked up to Guatemala’s transitional justice process(es).
Guatemala concluded a comprehensive peace process in 1996, but the majority of
reforms to transform Guatemalan society out of conflict were scuttled by a well-funded
and well-organized, elite-driven campaign to reject their adoption in a 1999 referendum.1
Also in 1999, the 90,000 criminal complaints filed in Guatemala City statistically resulted
in a zero percent conviction rate.2 Additionally, the murder rate per year in Guatemala,
1
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despite experiencing four examples of genocide during its civil war,3 has only dropped
17% from 5556 per year, to 4585 per year.4 Finally, amnesties were given to the most
egregious of human rights abusers, mostly state security personnel, following the civil
war. 5 Those amnesties generally resulted in many former state military and police
officials being “regrouped into crime gangs,”6 providing clandestine security for criminal
activity, or providing logistical and administrative support for such criminal activity
while working within state institutions.
The problem of impunity for crime in Guatemala during its civil war, but also
subsequent to it, reached a boiling point by 2003 when domestic and international
pressure resulted in an agreement to establish the Commission of the Investigation of
Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations (“CICIACS”)—the “first attempt
to break the cycle of impunity in Guatemala.” 7 After political gerrymandering and a
crippling Guatemalan Constitutional Court decision deeming CICIACS unconstitutional,
the project was tabled indefinitely. However, following the brutal murder and attempted
concealment of three Salvadorian members of the Central American Parliament who
were visiting Guatemala, international pressure intensified against Guatemala to reign in
impunity.8 The United Nations and Guatemalan civil society were able to craft a revised
commission proposal as a means to counter impunity in the country. Importantly, they
removed the politically and constitutionally controversial clause from the CICIACS
proposal which had given the commission independent prosecutorial capacity.9 The new
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proposal was titled the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
(“CICIG”) and it was ratified and entered into force by September 2007.10

2.2 Introduction
As the preceding section referenced, CICIG’s ties to transitional justice processes are
largely the result of a chain reaction. Amnesties were given during the peace process to
the vast majority of individuals implicated in the civil war from the political or military
sectors, but to nearly all high-ranking elites. Much of the country’s socio-political elite
subsequently rigged an electoral rejection of negotiated constitutional reforms dating
back to the peace process in a 1999 referendum. Anita Isaacs depicts this as a “clever
negotiating strategy” that exemplified the ‘emptiness of promises’ in the Guatemalan
context. 11 Ostensibly, she suggests that elites agreed to certain equity-enhancing
concessions during the peace talks when the international community and civil society
were both highly engaged in affecting an equitable peace in Guatemala. However, those
same elites knew that they could reverse those concessions in the future by promoting a
referendum to accept the key provisions as law. Moreover, Guatemala’s peace accords
focused most heavily on the demilitarization of Guatemalan politics and society, as well
as the creation of a civilian-controlled national police force (“PNC”).12 Less attention,
then, was given to justice reform.13 One final note, Schultze-Kraft has noted that after
extensive demobilization in Colombia, “a host of new illegal armed groups have sprung
up” many of which are at least partly organized by formerly employed military and
paramilitary commanders looking out for their own best interests.14 While a caveat is
important to issue here in that Colombia and Guatemala are by no means identical, the
patterns of criminal activity brought about by former combatants following programs of
amnesty and demobilization bear striking similarities. As for the aforementioned “chain
reaction,” then, poorly planned amnesties and demilitarization, core tenets of
Guatemala’s transitional justice and peace-building programme, can be seen to have left
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Guatemala vulnerable to other illicit processes and networks which then interfere with the
country’s overall post-conflict reconstruction.
Also necessary to qualify and explain is the level on the “ladder of abstraction” by
which CICIG must be theorized from a transitional justice standpoint.15 Many scholars
have argued in favour of a disaggregated, more general level of transitional justice theory
with a focus on measurements of the “average” conditions necessary to achieve “justice”
across very different transitional justice settings. 16 In this chapter, and this thesis in
general, I reject such an approach. Indeed, specific geographical contingencies
fundamentally alter the kind of justice being pursued, and the means by which it can be
pursued. While Snyder and Vinjamuri argue very broadly in favour of amnesties as a
means of eliminating potential destabilizing forces, in Guatemala, for example, it is
precisely for geographical reasons that amnesties have not worked.17 That is to say that
amnesties combined with networks of transnational organized crime have resulted in a
situation in Guatemala which blocks peace, foments violence, and enhances impunity.18
Thus, at least in Guatemala’s case, theories which focus on broad, universally- and
internationally-applicable “best practices” for producing justice outcomes fail precisely
because of their insensitivity to local geographical contexts. Moreover, conceptions of
justice vary across cultures and geographies, so a retributive justice-heavy theory, such as
any of the three aforementioned ones, may represent justice among certain audiences, but
fall short of affecting meaningful justice for others.19
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In short, from a theoretical standpoint, localized justice processes are vital,
especially in cases where transnational forces are at play and in countries with hugely
stratified societies like that of Guatemala. One important consideration, though, is that
models of transitional justice at an abstract, international level may help to better
understand localized justice processes. They offer a roadmap by which subsequent
scholars can better conceptualize and track justice developments and also more easily
isolate the precise points where such theories fail at a local level. But these more abstract,
internationally focused theories fall short in providing proscriptive capacity in Guatemala
specifically because of varying societal conceptions of justice, 20 and geographical
considerations which allow amnesties to be exploited to criminal ends.
Given that one can now see how CICIG, as an institution and process of affecting
the reduction of criminal impunity, is related to transitional justice in the Guatemalan
context, the chapter now turns to CICIG itself: its functional characteristics and its
institutional characteristics. Thus, the chapter proceeds in two parts according to those
distinctions: In the first part, I identify three main functions that CICIG takes on relative
to transitional justice in Guatemala: First of all, it deepens and broadens prior truth
recovery efforts. To use an analogy, a scholar might issue a second or later volume of a
book concerning a contemporary issue as a necessary rejoinder to account for previously
unavailable information. CICIG serves as a ‘later volume,’ or perhaps later volumes, of
truth recovery in Guatemala, relative to injustice and conflict, neither of which has
arguably never really ceased despite a formal peace accord.21 Secondly, CICIG serves as
a

recognition

and

acknowledgment

of

Guatemala’s

deficit

in

justice

and

unresponsiveness to victims’ claims. Acknowledgment is typically viewed as an
important initial step in allowing for “justice, reparations and reform that victim-
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survivors need and deserve.” 22 Thirdly, CICIG assists and strengthens the state’s
capacity for exacting retribution for illegal behaviour, much of which can be traced
either directly or indirectly to the country’s civil war.23 Of course, as retributive theory
goes, accountability is promoted and enhanced through prosecutions.24 Moreover, I make
the case that through CICIG’s three main functions of truth recovery, acknowledgment,
and retribution, the institution both signals a break with the past to Guatemalan society,
but it also tangibly affects such a break. I described, in the previous chapter, that
procedural justice’s most valuable contribution to transitional justice ought to be
conceived of as a capacity for signaling a new future, one based on fairness. In other
words, CICIG’s three main functions of truth recovery, acknowledgment, and retribution
combine to render CICIG’s role in Guatemala as being the harbinger of ‘justice as a
better future.’25
The final part of this chapter locates Guatemala within the institutional melée of
tried and tested transitional justice mechanisms. The value in such an exercise is that, first
of all, a mere description of CICIG’s activities and capacities does little to advance either
academic or policy-related interests—it really only serves a typological exercise which
hardly forwards the analysis of the institution. Instead, I take the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador (“CTES”) as a similar institution by which to locate, compare, and
contrast CICIG within the wide array of hybrid institutions which have been employed in
transitional justice processes. By locating CICIG’s institutional similarities in comparison
to another previously employed transitional justice mechanism, I attempt to demystify
CICIG relative to transitional justice. Moreover, I hope to be able to render some of the
extant research on the successes, challenges, and lessons learned from the CTES
applicable to CICIG, especially if it is to be an institutional model used in other
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transitional justice settings. I do not claim that the CTES is the only or even the most
comparable institution to CICIG. Rather, I argue that the CTES provides a good
comparison to CICIG due to their broad similarities in terms of origins, organization, and
function, although they are far from identical according to any one measure.

2.3 PART ONE:
CICIG’s Transitional Justice Functions
In the following pages, the first section of this chapter illustrates CICIG’s functions of
truth recovery, acknowledgment and retribution by analyzing the main elements of the
justice sector which it has had influence. I have consciously chosen this order of CICIG’s
transitional justice-related functions for their temporal sequence. For example, truth is a
logical necessity in order to affect any type of recognition or acknowledgment. Likewise,
acknowledgment is a necessary condition of retribution or punishment subsequent to
uncovering the truth and acknowledging it.
To deepen this analysis, I will start off analyzing trials related to CICIG,
predominantly that of ex-President Efrain Rios Montt, and how each of truth,
acknowledgment, and retribution are exemplified in pursuing retributive justice.
Secondly, I will analyze reforms, purges, and policy recommendations spearheaded by
CICIG. And finally, I will look at the Guatemalan National Reconciliation Law, the
general amnesty provision which was the final stumbling block preventing the conclusion
of the Guatemalan peace process to that point.26 In looking at the Guatemalan amnesties
doled out, I intend to display how CICIG, relative to amnesty in the Guatemalan context
was vital to: first, the uncovering of the truth of how and where the policy failed; second,
acknowledging its failure; and third, taking measures to correct its failure, including
punitive actions which can rightfully be described as retribution.

2.3a Trials
As Anita Isaacs has noted, many survivors of atrocity “connect truth with dignity and
repair.”27 Guatemala’s two official truth commissions’ reports lacked effective popular
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dissemination mechanisms28 while the state was very effective at suppressing them. As a
result, no significant national discourse on the issue of genocide ever took place—that is,
until very recently. The conviction of Rios Montt as guilty of genocide and crimes
against humanity, then, is significant in that it furthers the recovery and healing processes
of survivors by acknowledging the truth in a very public and internationally visible
manner that had been previously elusive. The reason for this is that Rios Montt’s trial
affected a major “memory battle,”29 one which did not really take place following the
release of Guatemala’s two truth commission reports. CICIG, as a hybrid commission
under the partial auspices of the United Nations, which assisted in the initially successful
prosecution of the first domestically convicted former head of state for genocide,30 was
able to muster a great deal of local and international attention. In contrast, Guatemala’s
two truth commission reports, those of the Historical Clarification Commission (“CEH”)
and of the Catholic Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory (“REMHI”), never did gain
any significant national attention largely due to weak, under-coordinated outreach efforts
and lack of accessibility.31 As such, a “productive if painful kind of struggle for memory”
was finally established by Rios Montt’s conviction,32 nearly 20 years after the end of the
conflict, giving a conclusive air and record to the nature of what took place during
Guatemala’s civil war. The state, not even the President himself,33 can no longer claim
that genocide never took place.
The Rios Montt trial also served to vindicate and affirm Mayan-Indigenous
suffering at the hands of the Guatemalan state.34 The mere fact that CICIG was able to
coordinate the requisite evidence, litigation expertise, and navigation within Guatemala’s
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infamously corrupt justice sector marked a “watershed moment.”35 Never before had the
Guatemalan state elevated the status of its Mayan-Indigenous population to the level of a
high profile, non-Indigenous ‘elite,’ as the Rios Montt trial did. As Viaene has
documented, a common Mayan tenet surrounding conflict resolution is that attention to
and acknowledgment of wrongdoing is a major piece of “[restoring] social harmony.”36
Thus, the mere investigation and recognition of wrongdoing perpetrated against the
Mayan-Indigenous population by the politico-military elite is evidence of Isaacs’
observation that “recognition of historical wrongs [carries] enormous symbolic political
weight.”37 The investigation and prosecution of Rios Montt was an acknowledgment of
wrongdoing. Given the historical inequity of Guatemalan society, this was a significant
achievement of justice unto itself.
Martha Minow has written that “trials create official records of the scope of
violence and the participants in it, and that guilty verdicts afford public acknowledgment
of what happened, and its utter wrongfulness.”38 In other words, they “speak the truth to
the relevant audiences.” 39 Moreover, Lisa J. Laplante has argued that “a defining
characteristic of post-conflict contexts is a profound tension between those who want to
deny or suppress memory in order to ‘move on’ in the name of peace and, on the opposite
end of the spectrum, those who struggle to reveal ‘the truth’ to ensure accountability for
and recognition of suffering.” 40 In the case of Efraín Ríos Montt, Elizabeth Oglesby
offers a useful understanding as to how retribution can be affected, even despite Rios
Montt’s conviction having subsequently been overturned. Oglesby has worked
extensively with Mayan-Indigenous genocide survivors, and to her, the most important
outcome of the trial has already been achieved: the assignment of culpability.41

35

Jo-Marie Burt, “Ríos Montt Convicted of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Sentence and its
Aftermath,” International Justice Monitor, May 13, 2013, accessed March 15, 2015; available from
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/rios-montt-convicted-of-genocide-and-crimes-against-humanity-thesentence-and-its-aftermath/.
36
Viaene, “The Internal Logic of the Cosmos,” 293.
37
Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 274.
38
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 123.
39
Ibid., 125.
40
Laplante, “Dialogues of Transitional Justice,” 622.
41
Angela Stuesse, “Si Hubo Genocidio: Anthropologists and the Genocide Trial of Guatemala’s Ríos
Montt.” American Anthropologist 115.4 (November 2013): 662.

51

Trials have the capacity to effect retribution by drawing “a bright line
demarcating the normative shift from illegitimate to legitimate rule,”42 according to Ruti
Teitel. As such, even though official punitive action may never be imposed upon Rios
Montt, truth recovery and official acknowledgment of wrongdoing have already, in a
sense, established a form of retribution: That is, the elevation of Mayan-Indigenous
grievances to be on par, at least symbolically, with the historically privileged Ladino
elites in Guatemala. Understood another way, CICIG has been able to affect certain
measures of retributive justice in Guatemala through its work in both shaming
perpetrators and also in downgrading the capacity of elites to maintain and foment
criminal impunity.

2.3b Justice Reform
Despite long-standing calls by Guatemalan and international civil society groups that the
Guatemalan state was corrupt, compromised, and often acting illegally according to its
own constitution and laws, there was little proof and lesser recourses to address the
situation. 43 The United Nations Verification Mission (“MINUGUA”), implemented
following the establishment of the 1996 peace accords, issued reports highlighting
Guatemala’s problems in “overcoming impunity.” 44 Most international donors, civil
society, and governments alike, implicitly recognized the problem of corruption and
impunity in their insistence on primarily funding initiatives run by the UN or civil society
groups within Guatemala, as opposed to state-run initiatives. 45 CICIG has provided a
truth-telling service relative to the variety of concerns over corruption and impunity. As
42
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Popkin and Roht-Arriaza argue, “the process of compiling [reports], as much as the final
product, [is] important.”46 To those ends, CICIG’s function of uncovering the truth has
served to validate the human dignity of victims of state violence and criminal impunity
by tangibly addressing and investigating their long-standing concerns.
Yet CICIG has not only comprehensively compiled reports detailing criminal
networks and their functions within the state, 47 it has also been involved in purging
hundreds of corrupt police officers.48 The commission also led an investigation which
culminated in charges against and the extradition of ex-Guatemalan President Alfonso
Portillo from his Mexico-based evasion of charges for corruption, as well as “embezzling
money from the Guatemalan government, during his presidency, totaling $15 million
dollars.”49 Finally, CICIG’s various justice sector reform policy recommendations as well
as their embedded and “impartial leadership at the [Ministerio Publico]” has led to a
strong influence over the dismissal and appointment of various bureaucrats,50 including
the appointment of the extremely successful former Public Prosecutor Claudia Paz y
Paz.51
CICIG’s role in uncovering the illegal activities which were and continue to be
taking place under the auspices of the state serves two purposes. First of all, similar to
one of the main hopes for Guatemala’s original truth commission, the CEH,52 CICIG’s
truth recovery functions help to prevent future abuses with the cover of the state.
International and domestic civil society now better understand the tactics which have
been used, and can mobilize and investigate more efficiently and effectively with that
knowledge. Moreover, the plethora of CICIG-trained justice sector bureaucrats should
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also contribute to downgrading the potential for illegal activities and networks to affect
impunity in Guatemala.53
Similar to CICIG’s role in using prosecutions as both a tactic and a threat in order
to downgrade the capacity for Guatemalan elites to escape justice and foment impunity,
the publication of knowledge of their illicit networks and clandestine dealings also inhibit
their capacities to continue their illicit activities in a “business as usual” manner. Victims
and survivors of crimes that have been met with impunity, during the civil war and
subsequent to it, have seen the uncovering of truth lead to tangible changes: institutional
reform, arrests, purges, and even prosecutions against individuals previously considered
“untouchable.”54 These changes are symbolically important and, thus, “[legitimize] the
ongoing struggle” by victims, civil society organizations, and activists. 55 CICIG has
uncovered the truth about how Guatemala’s “hidden powers” and “clandestine groups”
are organized, as well as how they typically function. By rejecting the status quo and
insisting on reform, lustration, and even prosecutions, CICIG has tacitly acknowledged
past injustices and helped the Guatemalan state onto a track of “[starting] to build the
public’s faith in justice or respect for the rule of law” that has been absent in Guatemala
since time immemorial. 56 Finally, by exacting retributive justice measures against
perpetrators of crimes and corruption, CICIG has utilized the truth it has uncovered, and
acknowledged its unacceptability—its related purges and prosecutions serve to either
rehabilitate and/or deter future would-be offenders.57
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2.3c Undercutting the Policy of Amnesty
Guatemala’s transitional justice programme has been undermined by impunity. CICIG
has served an important function in exhibiting how the amnesty program, established
during peace talks at the end of Guatemala’s civil war, was planned and enacted poorly.
Impunity has been insured through “clandestine groups” with a dogged “determination to
prevent justice for past abuses and to oppose military and intelligence reform.” 58
Importantly, such “clandestine groups” are primarily composed of former military and
paramilitary commanders.59 They tend to be contracted out as security or ‘muscle’ by the
“hidden powers” which “collude to control lucrative, illegal activities” as well as
conspiring to sustain monopolies and oligopolies over important industries.

60

Policymakers have historically recommended amnesties behind the logic that they will
produce more “truth and openness,”61 and an opportunity of transition for combatants
away from conflict-fomenting activities and back into a post-conflict society. Through
extensive research, documentation, and the production of compelling evidence to support
lustrations and prosecutions of corrupt officials working within the state, CICIG has
shown how the peace accord amnesties, embodied in the National Reconciliation Law,
have led to a weakened post-conflict state. The previously formalized socio-political
networks for exerting control over Guatemala until the end of the civil war have been
“progressively replaced by pervasive informal political-criminal networks with
transnational linkages.” 62 Naomi Roht-Arriaza argues that CICIG has shown that
“impunity for past crimes and impunity in the present are inextricably bound together” by
tracing the migration of former combatants into criminal enterprises and networks that
exist today.63
Thus, CICIG has ostensibly evidenced, with Guatemala as its case study, how
previous combatants can and do use amnesties to reconstitute their networks and
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expertise into lucrative, illegal activity, rather than reintegrating into society. 64 The
aforementioned qualities of “truth and openness” associated with amnesties are not
characteristic of Guatemala’s post-conflict realities of deceitful and furtive activity being
perpetrated by much of the same set of individuals which were granted amnesties in
1996. The obvious conclusion to be made is that amnesties, in the Guatemalan context,
did not function in a positive, peace-building manner. CICIG has been able to exhibit
why the extolled logic of amnesties, commonly advocated throughout the transitional
justice literature, fails to take root in Guatemala, and in other areas where the rule of law
is weak to begin with.65
Through extensive documentation and detailed analysis, CICIG has not only
served a truth-telling function relative to the poorly planned amnesty program in
Guatemala. By uncovering the causal processes which have rendered amnesty as a
“constructive acknowledgment of the past” a failed project in Guatemala,66 CICIG has
affirmed and acknowledged the outrage and frustration expressed by civil society when it
established the National Reconciliation Law.
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This recognition has important

repercussions in its capacity to coax the average Guatemalan back into the fold of
national civic life, from which he has long been excluded and to which he feels
ambivalent at best. Indeed, as Tom R. Tyler has opined, a member of any given society is
“very concerned” that his personal dignity and social inclusion is “recognized and
acknowledged.”68 Viewed from this light, CICIG’s confirmation of civil society’s dismay
and fears over the National Reconciliation Law, offers the potential to start to “reweave a
badly frayed communal social fabric” where the state has long ignored civil society and
the majority of citizen concerns.69
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CICIG has actively worked to promote and build capacity for domestic
prosecutions through the training of Guatemalan legal staff; investigation of perpetrators
of grave crimes; and the recommendation of institutional reform in the justice sector. Its
main tools in the battleground of transitional justice tactics pitting prosecution against
amnesty,70 however, are truth and acknowledgment. CICIG-based research and analysis
has exposed the truth about the failure of amnesty to realize its stated goals. By
displaying a recognition and acknowledgment of amnesty’s shortcomings, CICIG aligns
itself with the vast array of civil society actors and the victims of crime and impunity.
Thus, the failure of amnesties and truth commissions to affect significant justice in postcivil war Guatemala, combined with a large critical mass of victimized actors in
Guatemalan society, set in motion a preference and capacity for the prosecution of human
rights abusers, both past and present. Indeed, it is worth remembering, in light of the
failure of Guatemala’s amnesty provisions to affect a move towards justice and away
from conflict, that prosecutions “are not a panacea for human rights problems.” 71 They
are, however, at least empirically proven to “contribute to the institutional and political
changes necessary to limit repression.”72

2.4 PART TWO:
Locating CICIG Amongst Transitional Justice Institutions
Arguably the most up-to-date and comprehensive volume of hybrid criminal justice
institutions is Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional
Issues by Sarah Williams.73 However, CICIG goes unmentioned in the 400-page volume,
and the focus of the tribunals listed is almost entirely based on prosecution. As I have
previously discussed in this chapter, CICIG is characterized, at least in a transitional
justice context, as an institution which has certainly focused on prosecutions, but it has a
significant truth-telling and acknowledgment properties inherent to its functional
purview, as well. Andrew Hudson and Alexandra W. Taylor, then, have defined CICIG
70
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as a ‘hybrid institution’ “both because it is neither entirely national nor international and
because it combines the independent investigatory and limited prosecutorial powers of a
tribunal with ultimate deference to the domestic judicial system characteristic of a
commission.”74 They go on to explain how they believe that CICIG is best characterized
as an institution constitutive of a voluntary, bilateral agreement between the host country
and the United Nations (UN) Secretary General.75
The other examples that fit under their distinct typology of where CICIG “fits” in
their web of criminal justice institutions, as of 2010, are the Pakistani-UN commission to
investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the joint
United States (US)-Bulgaria Regional Criminal Justice Initiative (RCJI). The Bhutto
commission is little more than a truth commission, however, while RCJI embedded US
prosecutors into Bulgarian institutions with the goal of training justice sector employees
and proposing legislative changes. 76 One issue with Hudson and Taylor’s typological
location of CICIG is that neither of these above-mentioned examples is remotely
comparable, geographically speaking, with Guatemala. David Collier discusses how
region-specific case studies have provided the bulk of theoretical value to the field of
political science.77 Confirming this observation, forced disappearances and transnational
drug networks, to name two examples, have been salient issues in the transitional justice
processes of several Latin American countries in remarkably similar ways. 78 A Latin
America-focused lens, then, in finding a comparative similarity to Guatemala’s
transitional justice process appears to make sense. To that end, the most valuable
comparable hybrid institution to CICIG that I have found is the Commission on the Truth
for El Salvador (“CTES”).
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2.4a CICIG as a “Follow Up” Truth Commission
My belief is that Hudson and Taylor ought to have categorized the CTES along the same
criteria as the Bhutto Commission, RCJI, and CICIG. To begin with, according to their
analysis, CTES fits into another hybrid institutional model of embedding “international
judges and prosecutors directly into existing domestic institutions.”79 They go on to argue
that the CTES was a joint Salvadoran-UN investigation into “death squads and illegal
armed groups… composed of domestic and international investigators [and] empowered
to present a public report of its findings and refer information regarding crimes to the
Salvadoran prosecutor.” 80 In reality, however, the only major substantive difference
between CTES and CICIG is that CICIG has been endowed with an “unprecedented”
mandate which is designed to actually help to dismantle organized crime while
simultaneously assisting the state develop its justice and legal system to functional
capacities.81
Though CICIG is considered a hybrid institution, I want to argue that it is little
more than a reformulated truth commission. CICIG is ostensibly a “follow-up” truth
commission to Guatemala’s original one(s), designed to “investigate,” “identify,” and
“make [policy] recommendations.82 As I have discussed at length in the preceding pages,
Guatemala’s transitional justice processes largely derailed due to rampant impunity,
which sees a direct link with the 1996 amnesty applied in the name of transitional justice.
Thus, given that CICIG’s main responsibility is to investigate and counter impunity based
on those illicit networks, it is not such a stretch to say that it is a truth commission with a
capacity to affect greater institutional reform and retributive justice measures to counter
injustices. Again, the two features which distinguish CICIG from CTES (and most other
truth commissions) are: first, a capacity and mandate to assist the state’s justice system
prosecute criminals; and secondly, it has not emerged directly out of conflict and peace
negotiations. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, however, has convincingly exhibited how all truth
commissions have applied institutional and procedural feedback learned from prior
79
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commissions around the world. She evidences how Chile’s truth commission model was
based on finding a middle ground between those of Argentina and Uruguay; South Africa
largely modeled its truth commission on the Chilean model; and Rwanda applied a
“confession-for-leniency” model based on what took place in South Africa.83 In short, all
truth commissions exhibit some model of “hybridity” or institutional and procedural
creativity—Guatemala’s CICIG simply takes this step beyond the typical incremental
changes usually made by the latest incantations of truth commissions.

2.4b CICIG and CTES: Strong Similarities
In several important areas, CICIG and CTES are similar, yet there are important
differences. As far as similarities go, their respective origins and constitutions; their
styles of using truth to affect justice; and their mandates and techniques to affect
institutional reform are all each quite closely related. CICIG’s mandate is, however, more
robust which explains some of its broader mandate in comparison to CTES, as does the
fact that it was constituted after being removed from conflict for over ten years when it
began its work, whereas CTES was borne directly out of conflict with tensions still
running very high.
CICIG, much like CTES, was established in a fractious domestic setting where
the decision to involve international actors was made to ensure “accountability where
internal political conditions might not otherwise permit.”84 In the case of El Salvador, the
military-political establishment, as well as the country’s traditional economic elites, were
effectively neutralized by a militarily competent guerilla force as well as a “new
‘modern’ elite.” 85 Similarly CICIG was an “unprecedented” negotiation between
Guatemala and the UN Secretary General which reflected the “fragmentation of the
country’s elites.” 86 This dynamic is representative of a similar ‘modern’ elite battling
against a traditional elite over the trajectory of the state, especially the economy. As such,
due to the polarization and political stalemate based on domestic socio-political
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conditions, El Salvador turned to the UN to assist it carry out a truth commission.87
Similarly, Guatemala’s ex-President Oscar Berger, fearing the loss of societal control to
“illicit networks,” in addition to strong domestic and international civil and governmental
pressure, led to his administration (2004-2008) negotiating with the UN to establish
CICIG under its current mandate.88 Thus, in both El Salvador with its CTES, and later in
Guatemala with CICIG, international assistance was a requirement due to a fragmented
and, in the case of Guatemala,89 dangerous socio-political conditions.
CTES and CICIG have also employed a modus operandi of focusing on
“emblematic cases.” 90 In the case of El Salvador, the CTES focused on 33 specific
cases.91 Its team of international investigators deemed the scale of civil war era abuses to
be far too vast to focus on every individual case with its limited time and resources—
instead, it focused on broad patterns. CICIG has explained its focus on “emblematic
cases” as a means of developing general public trust in Guatemala’s state institutions,
while generating a feeling that impunity is being addressed.92 While CTES and CICIG
have approached their investigations based on different motives, the same underlying
principles apply. That is, first, that the necessary truth being uncovered is observable in
broad patterns. Secondly, that the symbolism of uncovering impunity and wrongdoing is
just as, if not more, important as the information itself.
CTES and CICIG also both aimed to combine truth recovery with retributive
capacities. This is less clear in the case of CTES because the government ostensibly
rejected its report and recommendations, due to intense political pressure. Indeed, various
pundits condemned the CTES final report for “failing to meet expectations for national
reconciliation.”93 Thus, the report was widely castigated and the commission’s mandate
did not involve any explicit retribution-affecting capacities to counter its rejection.
87
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Additionally, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza describe how a long history of a weakly
institutionalized rule of law in El Salvador worked against the commission. Ostensibly,
small institutional changes and justice measures would not be enough to secure
assurances that abuses would not take place again, nor that the effects of justice would
serve as a firm precedent.94 The country required massive structural changes for that to
happen. For CTES, without the capacity to affect significant institutional reform, nor
retribution, “some measure of truth became in effect a substitute, not a complement, to
justice.” 95 By “naming and shaming” the individuals that CTES found guilty of
perpetrating human rights abuses, they were able to exact some measure of justice.
Indeed, Viaene has discussed how shame takes on retributive properties.96 Moreover, in
discussing former President Efrain Rios Montt’s trial earlier in this chapter, I explained
how truth and acknowledgment served as a tool by which the social and legal status of
victims is elevated to near equality of their transgressors who have historically received
immunity for their crimes. In short, CTES recognized that the “long tradition of judicial
dysfunction and complicity made it unlikely, at least in the short term, that any judicial
process would follow its report.” 97 As a result, the commission attempted to affect
creative retributive justice measures on its own.
CICIG, on the other hand, did have a mandate to both “investigate and prosecute
clandestine security groups.”98 As the first part of this chapter discussed, CICIG used its
investigative mandate to uncover truth and acknowledge wrongdoing. It then used a
variety of tactics ranging from purges to prosecutions and even shame in order to exact
retribution against an oft-intransigent state apparatus and bureaucracy. On the surface,
CTES’ retributive-exacting capabilities are vastly inferior to those of CICIG. It did,
however, aim to utilize the same retributive logic. To recap, both commissions have used
the truth that they have investigated to compel their respective states into action. Even
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though CICIG had a formal mandate to do so while CTES did not, they both acted
according to the same ethos of affecting retribution.
One final major similarity between CTES and CICIG is the attempt both have
made to enact institutional reform in their respective jurisdictions through a dual tactic of
shame and international pressure. Using similar “naming and shaming” tactics to their
efforts to achieve retribution for wrongdoing, CTES was able to de facto, rather than de
jure, force a turnover of the entire Salvadoran Supreme Court roster of judges, all of
whom had been implicated with corruption charges.
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Despite the Salvadoran

government’s claims of ‘bias’ and ‘abuse of sovereignty’ against CTES’ foreign
commissioners,
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the shame combined with international pressure resulted in

compliance with some of the commission’s recommendations. The UN applied pressure
through the at-once carrot and stick of foreign aid funding which proved effective.101
Meanwhile, the spotlight and focus rendered by the official and international nature of a
UN-sponsored commission with foreign commissioners ensured that President Alfredo
Cristiani reluctantly complied with certain sanctions, lustrations, 102 and institutional
reform proposals where little political will existed to do so without such pressure. The
shame of being seen, on the international stage, to evade compliance altogether was
deemed more politically costly than enacting and observing at least some of CTES’
recommendations.
CICIG adopted a very similar strategy of utilizing both shame and international
pressure in order to enact institutional reforms. First, CICIG has been important in
empowering civil society by inviting them to investigate illicit groups alongside CICIG’s
foreign investigators. Van Hemmen has described the value in internationally-constituted
‘hybrid institutions,’ like CICIG, in that they “harness the credibility of international law”
while simultaneously “[pointing] at the obligation of the Government to act upon the
[peace] agreements.” 103 Although civil society organizations in El Salvador were
important to the country’s peace process, they were much stronger in Guatemala, both in
99
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terms of capacity and also international linkages.

104

Guatemalan civil society’s

association with CICIG has forced the government to listen and cooperate, representing a
formidable alliance of domestic and international concerns.
A second major avenue by which CICIG has improved institutional reform
processes is through the training of large numbers of legal professionals in Guatemala.105
This training has resulted in the growth of domestic civil society, but has also served to
develop extensive links between domestic and international civil society. What is clearly
taking hold is a new generation of well-trained legal professionals in Guatemala, and
many of them are contributing in important ways to the growth of civil society. As their
influence within both civil society and the state apparatus grows, the state must
subsequently become more responsive to them, because they are able to carefully
navigate through state procedures and institutions. They are also able to hold other legal
professionals to account,106 while also commandeering international attention and support
against Guatemala’s corrupt practices under the auspices of state institutions. 107 Thus,
CICIG has empowered civil society by providing them ‘cover’ and international
legitimacy, but also by training individuals who can navigate the system and hold their
government to account by ‘speaking its language,’ so to speak.
Similar to CTES, CICIG has parlayed its international prestige as a UN-affiliated
body into an ongoing spotlight on the Guatemalan government to ensure compliance in at
least some of its recommendations—Aldana suggests that public officials in the justice
department “feel watched for the first time.”108 Despite lacking the political will to adopt
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all institutional reforms and recommended policy changes,109 the government does feel
compelled to work with CICIG and “reform will, therefore, come slowly, but it is being
accomplished.”110 In large part, this compliance is sustained by international pressure on
Guatemala, such as American Vice President Joe Biden’s urging that Guatemala “must
cooperate with efforts to reduce levels of impunity in the region as a condition for
receiving a $1 billion aid package from the US.”111 Of course, in neither country and with
neither commission is compliance guaranteed, but the dually imposed tactic of shame and
international pressure have been used in both instances with a surprisingly high degree
of success against unlikely odds.

2.5 Conclusion
In seeking to establish where, exactly, CICIG ought to be conceived of in its relation to
transitional justice, I want to bring the reader back to the previous chapter. That chapter
established the need to account for procedural justice within transitional justice, writlarge. Moreover, I postulated that the most important value of considering procedural
justice within the larger ‘project’ of transitional justice is its capacity to signal a new
future, one based on fairness, in an attempt to break with a profoundly unfair past. To this
point, I have not explicitly explained the tie between the first chapter and this, the second,
one. I shall now endeavour to resolve any potential puzzlement as to how the two are
related.
This chapter has attempted to explain CICIG’s main functions and locate it within
the transitional justice lexicon of relevant functions and institutions. From a basic
functional level, I have argued that CICIG serves a truth-telling role. This truth is
employed by CICIG to at least reveal the potential for acknowledgment of suffering
and/or general wrongdoing. Through truth and acknowledgment, victims of violence
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and/or injustice are able to obtain closure through some form of retribution, which CICIG
has also shown itself capable of affecting. This is where procedural justice comes into
play: Each of these functions, both individually and collectively, work to signify change
and offer a reason for Guatemalan citizens to come together in a “cooperative venture”
with the hope that past injustices can be overcome.112
Specifically, I have argued that CICIG functions as something of a ‘follow-up’
truth commission. After concluding Guatemala’s two major truth commissions, a large
function of CICIG has been to analyze and investigate how and to where Guatemalan
society has progressed since that time. As the reader will recall, I have argued that
temporality and responsiveness are the vehicles by which Tom R. Tyler’s components of
procedural justice are then activated.113 To those ends, CICIG’s functions of truth and
acknowledgment have explicitly posited a measure of temporality into the process of truth
recovery in the Guatemalan context. Indeed, although it has not affected a “sustained
conversation” to the level of regular communication that Bernadette Atuahene argued
was important to the South African victims’ understanding of both fairness and justice,114
it has reinitiated the ‘conversation’ between Guatemalan victims and the state that had
been only briefly opened and then closed by Guatemala’s two truth commissions. At the
very least, the potential to develop greater civic trust within Guatemalan society is
presented where it had previously ceased to exist.
With an eye towards responsiveness, CICIG has enacted extremely important
reforms, lustrations, and prosecutions—even if the value of these is only symbolic in the
short term. First of all, the state has become more responsive to civil society in its close
relationship with CICIG: Guatemala’s civil society has grown its international ties and
improved its domestic competencies. It is now able to sustain a spotlight on the actions of
the state while conjuring international pressure to ensure the state’s compliance. Of
course, such steps may indeed be temporary as Guatemala’s current President Perez
Molina has refused to renew CICIG’s mandate which could very realistically result in a
backslide in the potential for long-term, sustained justice and societal equity. That being
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said, the training that CICIG has provided to individuals in the justice and security sector,
as well as the extensive domestic and international civil society roots that have developed
through CICIG’s coordination ought to lead to more equitable, if not democratic,
outcomes in comparison with Guatemala’s recent past. 115 Together, temporality and
responsiveness symbolize a break with the past for the long-alienated majority of
Guatemalan citizens, and at the very least, they offer hope for a better future.
Shifting the focus over to locating CICIG amongst the litany of transitional justice
institutions that have been employed over the years, I have argued that CICIG is quite
similar, from a functional-institutional standpoint, to the Commission on the Truth for El
Salvador (“CTES”). Let me make the case for why establishing a comparable institution
is important: Hudson and Taylor describe CICIG as a “unique hybrid structure.”116 That
statement and understanding, on its own, renders CICIG a relatively mysterious and lessrecognizable entity. By establishing close geographical and institutional similarities with
another transitional justice institution, CTES, academics can begin to demystify and
deconstruct CICIG. To be clear, I make no claims that CTES is the most similar
institution by which to compare CICIG. Rather, it simply matches up well with a variety
of CICIG’s institutional and geographical qualities. Most importantly, though, the
conclusion from this analysis is that if we are able to locate CICIG in a larger tradition
and history of transitional justice mechanisms, we have a larger pool from which to
derive lessons, insights, and understanding.
As for how to classify CICIG within the transitional justice’s institutional clutter,
its first and foremost role is that of an investigatory commission, albeit a hybridized one
with prosecutorial and reformative capacities built into its mandate. With regards to its
similarities with CTES, then, both commissions have similar bilateral negotiated origins
and functions. Moreover, they both work creatively within their constitutional
compositions to affect tangible justice outcomes. Finally, they have both also used their
mandates, and similar techniques to boot, in order to affect institutional reform. That said,
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they do also have significant differences. CICIG’s mandate is broader than that of CTES,
which perhaps explains some of its more robust and high profile efforts to affect justice,
as well as having the reputation of possessing a particular “uniqueness.”117 CICIG was
also created after being removed from conflict for over ten years when it became
functionally operational, while CTES was constituted directly out of peace negotiations
to end its brutal civil war. One could reasonably assume that tensions and passions were
much higher in the latter case, and political stakes were probably perceived to be much
more dire. But overall, CTES provides a useful foil by which to compare, contrast, and
locate CICIG amongst institutions that have been used in transitional justice processes.
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3. CHAPTER THREE:
EVALUATING CICIG’S SUCCESSES AND STRUGGLES
3.1 Overview:
The past two chapters have ostensibly laid out the criteria by which CICIG can be
evaluated. In the first chapter, I initially endeavoured to argue for the definition of
procedural justice within transitional justice processes. I am hardly the first to make this
argument, but there does appear to be a lack of consensus, definition, and even
recognition that there is a stream of transitional justice scholars all making similar or at
least compatible arguments. In other words, many arguments are being made that fall into
my definition of procedural justice, but the individuals making the arguments do not
necessarily realize or acknowledge that their arguments qualify as procedural justice, per
se. Thus, my first aim is to bring more scholars towards a consensus and definition on
specific elements that render transitional justice more successful or at least mitigate
elements which would render its processes more susceptible to failure. By including
elements of temporality and responsiveness (i.e. procedural justice), the larger project of
transitional justice is able to take the form of representing and signaling a new future for
that given society based on greater equity. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly,
procedural justice is inherently inclusive. Thus, it implicitly, though often explicitly as
well, serves to reject a past marred by violence and injustice. Finally, temporality and
responsiveness inject local considerations into processes of transitional justice. In
contrast, I would argue that many transitional justice processes and ideals to date have
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been theorized at abstract, internationally applicable levels of analysis.1 I am arguing that
through the procedural justice vehicles of temporality and responsiveness, the
theorization and practice of transitional justice in Guatemala and other localized contexts
can be based on a discursive, two-way feedback loop. Such a process would optimally
take into consideration local beliefs, practices, and contingencies, while foiling these
considerations against previously attempted transitional justice processes in other settings
in addition to even more abstract transitional justice theory(/ies). Overall, by including
procedural justice mechanisms within a society’s given transitional justice process, there
is a greater chance for success in affecting a socio-political trajectory characterized by
justice and equity.
In the second chapter, I argue that CICIG ought to be understood along both
institutional and functional lines. Functionally, I argue that CICIG is best conceived as a
hybridized truth commission, similar to that of the Commission on the Truth for El
Salvador (“CTES”) from the mid-1990s. The one major difference, I argue, is that CICIG
is enabled to assist in prosecutions of those found to be acting illegally. From a functional
standpoint, I argue that CICIG’s value in a transitional justice context falls into three
distinct, though related, functions: truth recovery; acknowledgment; and retribution.
Moreover, procedural justice is partially woven into CICIG’s functions through a
combination of truth recovery and acknowledgment. Ostensibly, they serve to initiate
temporal considerations by finally establishing a “deep conversation” and engagement at
both a society-wide and even global level for crimes committed both during and since the
country’s civil war.2 That conversation had been denied to Guatemalan victims of human
rights abuses and state malfeasance immediately following the release of both truth
commission reports due to the societal fear of elite retribution and violence that has
persisted in various forms for most of Guatemala’s history,3 part of the larger crime rate
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that CICIG has slowly but steadily helped to erode.4 Moreover, due CICIG’s close work
with Guatemalan civil society, the state is now more compelled to respond to its civil
society’s demands. This is a result of its improved capacity to sustain a spotlight on the
infamously corrupt Guatemalan state’s actions while commanding the international
legitimacy and support to compel state compliance.
This current chapter, then, builds on the prior two chapters in that I analyze the
strengths and flaws of CICIG to fulfill the transitional justice roles of truth recovery;
acknowledgment; and retribution. Yet CICIG was not exclusively envisioned as a
transitional justice mechanism and/or institution. It was also a practical response to a state
almost incapable and generally unwilling to “provide justice and public safety in an
efficient and equitable way to all citizens,” a hallmark of a “failed state.”5 Combined with
the instability that radiates outward from Central America, fomented by transnational
drug-related crime, the international community was, and still is, deeply concerned and
heavily focused on Central America. 6 By analyzing CICIG’s successes and failures
relative to its mandate and transitional justice outcomes, my hope is that policymakers,
especially when targeting transnational drug crime in Latin America, will have a bevvy of
comprehensive takeaways to apply moving forward.

3.2 Introduction
The following chapter will proceed in two parts. First, I will analyze the established
mandate of CICIG and to what extent it has been successful at fulfilling its mandate.
Specifically, CICIG’s three main objectives are: to investigate illicit and clandestine
security organizations and uncover their structures; to assist the state in disbanding such
groups through investigation and punishment of their crimes; and to make policy
recommendations to eliminate and prevent the re-emergence of the aforementioned
groups.7 Tove Nyberg argues that due to the amnesties following Guatemala’s civil war,
2008. See Unfinished Business: Guatemala’s International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), Open
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many former human rights abusers have subsequently become involved in the security
organizations that have helped to establish organized crime and increased impunity in the
country.8 It is precisely this link between civil war atrocities and contemporary criminal
impunity-related instability in Guatemala that renders an analysis of CICIG with an eye
towards transitional justice-related strengths and weaknesses to be important.
Thus, this chapter will argue that CICIG has experienced a “mixed bag” of
successes and failures relative to its mandate: It has been successful at investigating and
uncovering criminal ties and networks as they are related to state institutions. It has also
successfully assisted in prosecuting and/or purging corrupt civil servants within state
institutions. However it has not been nearly as successful at investigating and uncovering
the intricacies of illicit groups outside of their connections to the state. Finally, it is rather
difficult to meaningfully analyze success or failure in CICIG’s mandate to “make
recommendations to the State of Guatemala regarding public policies to be adopted,”
given that it has no ability to ensure full compliance to such recommendations.9 Overall,
CICIG’s mandate underestimated the nature and capabilities of transnational, drugrelated criminal networks, by which its mandate to disband them through prosecution is
unrealistically hopeful in retrospect.
As for the three transitional justice functions which CICIG fulfills—truth
recovery, acknowledgment, and retribution—I will argue that, similar to my evaluation of
CICIG’s success vis-à-vis its mandate, CICIG has experienced significant successes and
has also been met with significant challenges. I also argue that important lessons can be
drawn from each function: Relative to truth recovery, a greater focus is and has been
needed to improve the capacity of the institutions and the skills of the civil servants in
Guatemala’s justice and security sectors, but also work to cultivate and build capacity
amongst civil society. Corresponding to acknowledgment, a greater civil society presence
is required to connect and/or translate CICIG, Guatemala, and the international justice
norms to indigenous and campesino communities and individuals—and vice versa.
Finally, in considering retribution, a transnational body or task force is required to
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combat transnational crime in Latin America, most of which is facilitated and financed
through the drug trade.

3.3 Efficacy of CICIG: A Focus on its Mandate
The CICIG mandate has three main goals for the commission: to investigate and
ostensibly uncover illicit, clandestine groups; to disband illegal groups through
prosecutions; and to make recommendations for public policy.10 Evaluating the success
of policy recommendations in a vacuum without accounting for results is a difficult task,
however. For the sake of illustration, let us consider the issue surrounding amparo laws:
Amparos, to give some background, were originally designed as a legal tool to instigate
constitutional challenges. 11 Given how amparos have now been commandeered as a
tactic to regularly obstruct and delay justice by those with a vested interest in advancing
the cause of impunity, 12 it was prudent for CICIG to recommend changes to amparo
laws.13 However legislators, as the International Crisis Group has documented, are very
reticent to approve justice enhancement measures which regularly impinge on their own
interests.14 Naturally, then, changes to amparo laws have not been forthcoming. Under
current Guatemalan President Perez Molina, there has even been a notable backslide of
CICIG-induced justice and due process achievements in Guatemala; thus it is difficult to
imagine how changes to amparo laws could take place in the near future.15
There is some hope for greater institutional change, however. President Perez
Molina had repeatedly stated that CICIG’s mandate would not be renewed up until April
2015, a claim he was forced to back away from due to two specific events. First of all, the
United States placed immense pressure on Guatemala, even sending Vice President Joe
Biden to meet personally with President Perez Molina. Renewing CICIG was reportedly
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an item at the very top of Biden’s agenda.16 Secondly, in conjunction with the Public
Ministry (“MP”), 17 CICIG acted in a dramatic, self-preserving fashion by moving to
“dismantle a network allegedly siphoning off customs revenue” in late April 2015. 18
Huge protests and related pressure have been brought to bear against Guatemala’s elected
leaders as a response to the fraud scandal. Indeed, Perez Molina’s Vice President Roxana
Baldetti was forced to resign over the pressure resulting from the issue, as her former
private secretary is said to be the ringleader of the operation.19 Feeling immense pressure
over the scandal, Perez Molina, in May 2015 alone, “has fired or accepted the
resignations of his vice president, tax chief, two energy ministers, security minister,
environment minister and head of intelligence,” in a desperate attempt to hold onto the
Presidency against a cacophony of calls for his resignation.20 One ought to be cautious in
viewing the latest episode of governmental malfeasance and corruption as a watershed
moment or harbinger of lasting change though. After all, a former Guatemalan President,
Alfonso Portillo, was charged and extradited to the United States for embezzlement with
CICIG’s assistance.21 Yet corruption and impunity went largely unhindered for several
years after Portillo left office.
Analysts can and should remain hopeful that lasting change is finally coming to
Guatemala. That the country’s citizenry has very recently developed its first “modern
mass protest movement” of note in the wake of the recent customs scandal is an
encouraging sign that justice and accountability have finally gained a foothold in
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Guatemalan politics.22 However, as Roderick Leslie Brett reminds us, Guatemala does
possess a long history of “institutionalised impunity,”23 not to mention the pervasive and
violent influence and power that transnational narcotrafficking networks continue to
assert.24 Thus, given the ease by which CICIG has been able to recommend necessary
policy changes, and the reticence of legislators to enact those policy changes when they
threaten legislators’ core interests, “policy recommendation” is a difficult mandate by
which to meaningfully determine success. Moreover, even in the case of successful
policy implementation, it has been largely fruitless relative to quelling transnational
organized criminal activities. In evaluating the success of CICIG, then, I think I can
comfortably discard the mandated goal of “recommendations for public policies” as an
evaluative mandate and instead focus on the former two goals in its mandate: to
investigate illicit groups; and to disband and promote prosecution against them.
The investigatory mandate that CICIG was originally designed to undertake
contains two provisions: “CICIG should investigate the existence of illicit security forces
and clandestine security organizations.” 25 The second provision contains that CICIG
should “identify the structures… activities, operating modalities and sources of
financing.”26 Relative to this mandate, CICIG was quite successful in investigating the
existence of such organizations. Its investigations resulted in various trials uncovering
corruption and malfeasance in the National Civil Police (“PNC”) and by former President
Alfonso Portillo. 27 However, it also faced some significant obstacles: To begin with,
there is little evidence to suggest that there is any deep and intricate understanding of
how these organizations and networks function, eight years after CICIG’s establishment.
22
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It follows, then, that without much in-depth understanding of the phenomenon that the
institution is designed to address, the task of disbanding criminal networks is rendered
that much more difficult to complete. On the one hand, corruption within Guatemalan
state institutions appears to be well understood and regularly uncovered and prosecuted.28
Yet individuals working in Guatemala’s justice system face ongoing “threats and
violence,” 29 and CICIG’s latest published report fails to document any significant
identification and delineation of criminal networks outside of the auspices of the state.30
Thus, CICIG has effectively investigated and uncovered corruption and illicit activity
within state apparatuses, but has been much less successful at developing a
comprehensive understanding relative to illicit structures and organizations beyond the
purview of the state.
CICIG’s investigations have ultimately been hindered by two more problems.
First, CICIG’s failure to consult and strategize with civil society in its early goings set the
stage for some tense relations with Guatemalan civil society which took time to
overcome and prevented effective investigative collaboration early in its mandate. 31
Second, CICIG has been far too beholden to individuals. As Helen Mack, a major player
in Guatemala’s human rights community, has noted, a lack of institutional capacity for
investigations was overshadowed by the impressive capacities of former Public
Prosecutor Claudia Paz y Paz.32 CICIG’s close relationship with former Public Prosecutor
Claudia Paz y Paz also served to obscure its lack of institutional capacity for
investigation, and this has subsequently come to the fore as a problem since the
controversial dismissal of Paz y Paz in 2014.33 CICIG never did fully develop and realize
a strong institutional capacity for undertaking and coordinating complex investigations on
its own, let alone within the state apparatus.
CICIG’s final mandate yet to be discussed so far is that of helping the state both
disband and prosecute illicit security groups and their ties to organized crime—
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sometimes this informal network is referred to as Guatemala’s “hidden powers.”34 As I
have mentioned, CICIG has made notable steps forward in promoting justice and
achieving major trials and prosecutions against individuals connected with “government
institutions, [politics] or drug-trafficking organizations.”35 CICIG was also instrumental
in rendering Guatemala as “the first country to convict a former head of state [Efraín Ríos
Montt] of genocide in its own court system” in 2013.36 Yet one issue preventing CICIG
from disbanding and prosecuting illicit groups is its lack of institutional resilience. For
example, Briscoe and Stappers have noted that CICIG’s efficacy has been significantly
reduced due to President Perez Molina’s organizational and philosophical differences
with the commission. 37 CICIG is also still heavily dependent on political will within
Guatemala. The current system of limited accountability affords privileges to individuals
ranging from elites to former military types, and even extending deeply into Guatemala’s
middle class. 38 Meanwhile, indigenous and/or campesino populations tend to view
politics with a lack of knowledge and interest, 39 largely borne of long-standing
disenfranchisement. Thus, until very recently, there has been little domestic impetus for a
significant increase in the country’s political will to change the status quo of impunity.
That may be changing with the massive protest movement spawned by CICIG and the
MP’s revelation of a huge government customs fraud conspiracy, but the social
movement is very young, and Guatemala’s elites have a long history of reasserting their
control.
The Economist Intelligence Unit recently opined that public mistrust in
institutions and high levels of impunity in Guatemala are both likely to contribute to
increase socio-political instability in the country in the near future.40 Similar problems—
public mistrust and high levels of impunity—have been ongoing since the end of the
34
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country’s civil war, begging the question what, if any, effect that prosecutions have had
on undermining impunity and downgrading illicit security groups. Moreover, current
Guatemalan President Perez Molina, once a strong ally for CICIG, 41 has taken an
adversarial role against the commission as his presidency has progressed. 42 The
Guatemalan people, for their part, have no interest in paying more taxes to a system they
see as corrupt.43 Without more funding for a domestic address to reducing corruption and
security concerns, and without the country’s permission to continue a joint internationaldomestic commission to do so, the problem of impunity is likely to persist and perhaps
even increase. So while CICIG has successfully instigated and assisted with prosecutions,
these have had little effect on creating longer-term sustainability in combatting impunity
and illicit activities within the purview of the state.
The state is beginning to revert to a culture of impunity once more under
President Perez Molina, suggesting that successful prosecutions have not strongly
affected the disbandment of illicit security groups. This speaks to two separate issues:
First of all, the mandate itself was flawed in its conception that prosecutions would help
to disband illicit networks. At the same time, the prosecutions and disbandment were not
mutually exclusive in CICIG’s mandate. They were both to be pursued as separate but
related goals. As such, while CICIG was quite successful in its strategy of prosecuting
emblematic cases,44 the clear lack of inertia and lack of sustain combined with continued
large-scale impunity and public mistrust in state institutions suggests that CICIG’s
attempts to downgrade and dismantle illicit criminal groups has been largely
unsuccessful.
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3.4 Efficacy of CICIG: A Focus on Transitional Justice
Before entering into a thicker analysis of CICIG’s strengths and drawbacks relative to the
transitional justice processes of truth recovery, acknowledgment, and retribution, a short
explicatory note is required. In the interests of space and also because various analysts
and organizations have published quality academic work on CICIG’s successes and
failures, I will not be explaining them in significant depth. But, indeed, my intent with
this part of the chapter is to analyze and situate CICIG’s strengths and weaknesses
relative to the three aforementioned transitional justice functions. Thus, I intend to offer
a brief overview of CICIG’s successes and drawbacks, but will spend the bulk of my
analysis on the “overall picture,” so to speak, and even more so on the implications or
“takeaways” from such analysis.
The majority of academic work concerning CICIG thus far has fallen into four
main camps, though with a significant amount of overlap. Though this list is by no means
exhaustive, it does offer a useful, if broad, overview of CICIG-specific analysis. First,
there are those who are tracking and analyzing CICIG’s progression as an institution,
such as Dinorah Azpuru’s extensive polling and analysis of public opinion relative to
CICIG;45 CICIG’s own “annual” and “thematic” reports;46 or van Hemmen’s tracking of
NGO influence relative to CICIG’s successes. 47 A second strand of analysis has
approached the study of CICIG from a legalist and/or normative point of view looking at
its capacity to improve “justice” outcomes within Guatemala. 48 For example, the
International Crisis Group has focused on the importance of institutional design and
capacity building,49 while Briscoe and Stappers, writing a report on behalf of Impunity
Watch, are most concerned with improving a combination of legal and cultural
constructions in Guatemala as a means of improving “future policies in security and
justice.”50 A third stream of CICIG analysis seeks to improve CICIG directly through
policy adjustments, seeing it as a vital cog in improving any number of peace, justice,
45
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democracy, and/or human rights outcomes in Guatemala. Falling into this camp are the
likes of Julia Schünemann, who authored a report on joint behalf of the Initiative for
Peacebuilding and FRIDE: A European Think Tank for Global Action,51 as well as a
report commissioned by Open Society Foundations. Another strand of literature concerns
those who view CICIG as a useful but ultimately insufficient tool for combatting crime
and injustice due to its domestic—as opposed to transnational—mandate. Michael
Deibert sees CICIG as having performed some important functions, but that it is unable
to effectively help Guatemala establish good governance and counter impunity without
eliminating or heavily downgrading transnational drug trafficking that afflicts the
country.52 Likewise, Michael Shifter sees regional security, justice, and good governance
as requiring “shared responsibility” by regional actors.53
While each strand of the aforementioned literature holds valuable insight, the
approach of my investigation is slightly different. I aim to add to a very limited
scholarship of taking lessons learned from the CICIG experience in Guatemala, and using
them to improve CICIG’s operations in Guatemala, but also to render them applicable in
other, specifically regional, contexts as well. To that end, Roger Atwood, at the
Washington Office on Latin America (“WOLA”), argues that “CICIG holds many lessons
for advocates seeking to protect the rule of law and end impunity in Latin America,”
outlining “inclusion,” “flexibility,” “international pressure,” “seizing the moment,” and
“political will” as the key factors. 54 While I undertake to uncover and apply lessons from
the CICIG experience in Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America, I am looking to take
away lessons from the CICIG experience specifically related to transitional justice
processes. Even more specifically, the previous chapter defined truth recovery;
acknowledgment; and retribution as the functions that CICIG effects, relative to
transitional justice, with elements of procedural justice incorporated into the dual
processes of truth recovery and acknowledgment. Thus, the following analysis briefly
establishes an overall appraisal of successes and struggles of CICIG relative to the three
aforementioned transitional justice processes, and then argues for progressive takeaways
51
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in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region. By “progressive takeaways,” I mean that in the
previous chapter, I described truth as preceding acknowledgment and acknowledgment as
subsequently preceding retribution. Likewise, any aims at making CICIG more effective
(or less ineffective, perhaps) in Guatemala or elsewhere would likely best follow a
progression beginning with truth.

3.4a Truth
Three significant CICIG successes at truth recovery are worth mentioning: First, it has
uncovered how illicit activity is connected between the state and clandestine groups. In a
model example, CICIG was instrumental in uncovering a layered conspiracy, the “Matus
affair,” which followed a trail of malfeasance all the way from El Salvador-based
organized crime and its interests up to some of the highest ranking bureaucrats inside of
Guatemala’s Ministerio Publico (MP) and its Ministry of the Interior.55 Secondly, CICIG
has investigated such networks to the point of recognizing the ties between Guatemala’s
civil war and its related atrocities to the present day, with the continued human rights
violations that regularly take place. This is a particularly important “link” between truth
recovery and transitional justice relative to CICIG—prior to CICIG’s arrival, these
theorized networks were little-known, hence being named as “hidden powers” in a 2003
report commissioned by WOLA. 56 Any information published about such elements
within Guatemala “would be absorbed by illicit networks, who [sic] would then adapt
themselves immediately so as to avoid detection.” 57 Thirdly, CICIG has effectively
secured a greater opportunity for civil society and community organizing that both assist
disenfranchised citizens to develop a voice within the state without being quelled by the
forces of impunity—while Guatemalan civil society was once mostly cowed by threats of
violence and a sense of hopelessness.58 It is now a vital piece, emboldened by CICIG’s
55
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assistance in capacity-building and sustained international pressure, in pushing for
transparency and accountability from the state.59
CICIG’s truth recovery successes are rather evident in any cursory reading of
them, but its weaknesses most effectively frame the lessons which analysts are likely to
benefit from in crafting another CICIG-like institution in the future. First of all, it is
questionable whether the capacity and willingness exist in Guatemala to independently
investigate and push for the prosecution of high-powered criminal elements, even after
nearly eight years of CICIG’s existence. The appointment of an allegedly corrupt
Attorney General, Conrado Reyes, back in 2010, 60 and more recently, the refusal to
renew the contract of the exceedingly successful former Attorney General, Claudia Paz y
Paz,61 evidence that “a single person can ruin the work of years in a matter of days by
removing capable and committed individuals from their posts.” 62 Essentially, the state
has not been thoroughly enough transformed—in terms of political culture, individual
and departmental capacity, and institutional design—to render CICIG’s achievements
self-sustaining.
Another weakness related to CICIG’s truth recovery function is that truth alone,
as the relative state inaction following the published results of two damning truth
commission reports would attest, 63 is no guarantee of acknowledgment, let alone
retribution. Another lesson to be taken from Guatemala’s two truth commission reports is
that distant, “self-serving,” and “insensitive” truth commissions can actually produce
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more harm than good.64 CICIG’s offices are in Guatemala City, and it has centralized
most human rights cases away from rural areas in Guatemala.65 These realities, combined
with the commission’s international influences, would suggest that sensitivity and
cultural appropriateness are not especially high priorities. One final weakness relative to
CICIG’s capacity for truth procurement is that, due to the extent of corruption and
impunity in Guatemala, CICIG is forced to narrow its agenda, with one of its criteria
being “the short and long-term political impact of the case on the fight against
impunity.” 66 Individuals experience a form of reparative justice through “interaction,
debate and discussion, but also… affirmation and acknowledgment of a person’s pain,”
as Lieselotte Viaene describes. 67 With such a limited analysis of cases, CICIG must
necessarily bypass a significant level of truth recovery as well as the potential for
acknowledgment and repair. While CICIG does offer some semblance of “justice as a
better future” in its attack on institutionalized impunity and criminality in Guatemala,68
most victims of criminal impunity will likely never receive a comprehensive accounting
of the truth behind their victimization under CICIG’s present structure.
To synthesize the previous discussion on CICIG’s strengths and weaknesses
relative to its function as a truth-producing element in Guatemalan society, there is now a
much greater understanding of the illicit behaviour afflicting Guatemala. The networks,
their functions, and the modus operandi of criminal elements within Guatemala have
been largely demystified through CICIG’s efforts. But the end goal of such understanding
is still vague. With Guatemala’s many victims, its vastly disparate socio-economic
relations, and its poor governance, the understanding of illicit behaviour in Guatemala
still needs to be connected with justice-producing mechanisms. Ostensibly, there is a
weak link, from a transitional justice standpoint, connecting CICIG’s truth recovery
function to the subsequent acknowledgment and retribution functions that CICIG also
undertakes. Given that CICIG was, at least partly, “created as a step in a transitional
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justice process,” 69 the “weak link” I describe can be best categorized as a failure to
address individuals’ grievances and concerns for justice while simultaneously failing to
directly establish adequate institutionalization, capacity, and a change in Guatemala’s
political culture which would render the state self-sufficient in maintaining an effective
justice system. Some of this, of course, is outside of CICIG’s power, such as “the lack of
political will to pass inalienable legislation to fight impunity.”70 Yet, as Rebecca Tran
noted, as of May 2011, it has “devoted itself almost exclusively to the prosecution of
corruption cases, leaving little time to execute the badly needed institutional reforms.”71
To remedy the pitfalls that CICIG currently experiences in its truth procurement
functions, it must either find a way to expand its activities or it must shift its priorities.
While investigations and subsequent prosecutorial assistance have served as the
backbone of CICIG operations since its inception in 2007, the state’s lack of justicerelated self-sufficiency eight years later is a relevant concern. Guatemala has failed to
significantly change its institutions and institutional culture to render it capable of
successfully maintaining CICIG’s level of professionalism and prosecutorial success.
Meanwhile, the state’s civil servants and related institutional capacity to undertake
investigations and prosecutions is heavily limited by the number of individuals which
CICIG has trained. While CICIG regularly boasts its successes in training public
officials, as of its latest published report, it claims to have directly trained 236 public
officials, an “additional 138 officials [which] have benefitted from skills transfer,” and a
rather vague claim that “certain offices have received technical support.”72 While perhaps
the techniques imparted and officials trained were of high strategic value, such numbers
represent a pitiful quantity against the backdrop of four government ministers, two police
directors, and 1700 police officers which have been publicly named for their complicity
in corruption or otherwise criminal activity. Moreover, over 50 prosecutors and
investigators as well as 12 other staffers have been removed from the MP at CICIG’s
request. 73 In sum, CICIG’s strategy of pursuing investigations and prosecutions is not
69
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resulting in institutional improvement nor is it building sufficient capacity amongst
public employees.
CICIG could remedy this increase issue by increasing its $20 million annual
budget supplemented mostly by 13 donor governments and over 200 employees.74 Doing
so would mean being able to maintain its successful operations currently under way, and
expand its capacity-building operations. But increased donor reliance has significant risks
involved: “Donor fatigue” has scuttled various aid and development projects, 75 while
overreliance on volatile economies has plagued others. 76 Another option for CICIG
would be to shift its core organizational strategy. CICIG could evolve its role into one of
coordinating third parties—aid organizations, governments, and civil society—to
undertake capacity-building tasks while maintaining its strong investigative/prosecutorial
work. However, such a strategy, would render its “relatively successful donor
coordination in a field where donor support is often provided in an uncoordinated
piecemeal fashion,”77 to the wayside. Donors tend to act according to their interests and
abilities, which admittedly sometimes leads to “backsliding” in terms of justice
outcomes.78
A particularly appealing final option aimed at the transitional justice goal of
connecting truth with acknowledgment and retribution, would be to augment the
organizational timeframe so as to better affect long-term sustainability as well as improve
localized experiences of justice. CICIG, or a future, similarly constituted institution,
could take a couple of years to focus solely on relationship building, training, and
capacity building, and slowly build its way up to investigative capacity. With proper
training and tools, civil society actors would be better able to affect justice at a localized
level, whereby they could correspond, interview, and investigate human rights complaints
in the vast abyss of victims of human rights abuses, past and present, in Guatemala. In
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doing so, they would be contributing CICIG’s truth recovery efforts and also providing
greater evidence for its prosecutorial mandate. The Guatemalan church-based REMHI
report employed such a method of truth recovery, lauded by many analysts as more
locally and culturally appropriate than that of the CEH report, 79 which was an
internationally-influenced commission more akin to how CICIG is constituted and
functions today.
Moreover, if CICIG spent the time to effectively train significant numbers of
investigators, prosecutors, and police officers, it would exponentially enhance its
investigative capacity in years subsequent, while ensuring greater domestic ownership
over the process. One of the largest problems experienced by the Guatemalan national
police force (PNC) after its establishment in 1997 was a rapid and “serious internal
degradation” into corruption after being well-trained by Spanish law enforcement
experts. 80 The PNC simply had no oversight or accountability structures in place. 81
Valuable CICIG staff, currently being used mostly for investigations, could oversee a
much larger number of CICIG-trained Guatemalan public employees in the security and
justice sectors, while regularly scanning for irregularities, corruption, and malpractice.
Essentially, by spending more resources to build up Guatemalan civil society while
simultaneously training more justice and security officials, CICIG could initiate a
“ratchet effect” of a mutually securing feedback loop between civil society and
Guatemala’s justice and security sector. Civil society, especially through the spotlight
and legitimacy bestowed upon it by both CICIG and concurrent increase in international
civil society and governmental links, would better be able to hold Guatemala’s public
institutions to account. Justice and security ministries and institutions in the Guatemalan
government would feel more compelled provide greater security and justice for
Guatemalan citizens due to this civil society pressure. Buttressed heavily by an increase
in international connectedness, Guatemalan civil society has been successful securing
greater domestic prosecutions in recent years,82 while also successfully coordinating the
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campaign to constitute CICIG in the first place.83 It is also regularly the point of first
contact and communication with many disenfranchised victims in the country. Kathryn
Sikkink’s well-respected argument that international civil society has the potential to
compel normative compliance behind global justice norms appears to hold true in
Guatemala’s case. 84 CICIG, or a similarly constituted institution in the region in the
future would be wise to make a concerted effort at capacity building amongst both state
and civil society forces, prior to (further) embarking on a heavy program of investigation
and prosecution.

3.4b Acknowledgment
Relative to its effects on acknowledgment within Guatemala’s seemingly never-ending
transitional justice process, CICIG has succeeded in three key areas: First of all, it has
been able to affect a low level acknowledgment for virtually every Guatemalan citizen
which has been victimized through human rights abuses and subsequent impunity. It has
done this by focusing on “a number of paradigmatic judicial cases, which have been
intended to expose the methods and concealed structures of criminal activity across the
country.” 85 I previously mentioned that CICIG’s inability to recover truth in the vast
majority of human rights cases was a weakness. But relative to acknowledgment, this
strategy of pursuing “emblematic cases” has uncovered broad patterns of state
malfeasance and

citizen

mistreatment

which

serves

as

an

implicit

“public
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acknowledgment of what happened, and its utter wrongfulness.” Even though a full
accounting of the facts is being overlooked, a broad acknowledgment of familiar patterns
of state wrongdoing provides some consolation and the opportunity for closure.
Secondly, through the recognition of victims and the publishing of names in the process,
even though full retribution may not be affected, the shame bestowed upon perpetrators
through such a process utilizes the same logic by which truth commissions attempt to re-
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bestow dignity upon victims,87 and has been viewed as a successful acknowledgment in a
variety of settings. It helps to re-establish a shared moral understanding by recognizing
that a moral norm was previously transgressed.88 Finally, through its investigative and
prosecutorial actions, CICIG has begun to develop a critical consciousness based on
truth: Yes, the state has been acting illegally. But such a consciousness also extends to
acknowledgment: No, such behaviour is not acceptable. The fact that Guatemalans are
recently taking to the streets in massive demonstrations for “the first time in decades” is a
testament to a developing unhappiness over what has ostensibly been a commonplace
occurrence in the country throughout its history.89
For CICIG’s successes relative to acknowledgment, however, it has also
experienced some unforeseen drawbacks: First, some acknowledgment of state
wrongdoing can serve to exacerbate existing social tensions, especially in highly
victimized, stratified indigenous communities. Gearoid Miller writes that international
efforts to administer hybrid institutions “are unlikely to produce predictable local
experiences, but may have unpredictable and potentially even conflict-promoting
effects.”90 Given that CICIG has pursued a retribution-heavy strategy, and that “all legal
systems fail to meet many of the expectations citizens have of them,” 91 it is hardly
surprising to see “some communities turning to extra-institutional vigilantism including
cases of extrajudicial executions.”92 More acknowledgment is being effected at the state
level, but little is being done to effect justice among localized populations. Secondly, and
highly related to the first point, CICIG’s lack of a communication and outreach strategy
in its early going harmed its capacity to earn the trust of Guatemalans.93 Indeed, victims
and their families and/or the lower socioeconomic stratum in Guatemala view CICIG
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with less confidence and trust than most of their compatriots.94 This revelation brings into
question how much effect CICIG-affected acknowledgment actually has on the average
indigenous and/or poor ladino Guatemalans who have been disproportionately
victimized, both past and present, by state intransigence and its related ambivalence.
Finally, CICIG’s predominantly “international” means of operating and organizing
establishes an air of elitism and distance between it the majority of human rights victims.
The difference between the Mayan outlook on justice versus that of CICIG is particularly
poignant: “What benefit would a prosecution bring for [survivors]? If the intellectual
perpetrators [of human rights crimes] are in prison they cannot help victims,” 95 one
Mayan genocide survivor asked. It is unclear that CICIG-instigated acknowledgment is
even recognized or understood by certain victims of atrocity.
I think it prudent to suggest that CICIG, or at least the tangible outcomes related
to its activities, has more effectively cultivated acknowledgment outcomes than it has
truth recovery. This may be slightly confusing, as the theoretical backdrop of CICIG’s
role relative to transitional justice that I have conceived is predicated on the notion that
truth precedes acknowledgment, which then precedes retribution. What I am suggesting
here is that CICIG has achieved significant truth recovery successes, but that reform is
required to better institutionalize those successes. Without any institutional reform to
cement such successes, once CICIG’s mandate eventually runs out, individuals interested
in undermining the rule of law in Guatemala will be able to exploit the existing justice
and security sectors in similar ways that they have been to date. Perhaps most
importantly, a greater reach into the periphery of Guatemalan society is a fundamental
necessity for acknowledgment to affect those most persecuted. One must remember, of
course, that Guatemala is highly stratified along lines of both race and class. On the one
hand, CICIG’s previously described “shallow reach” has affected acknowledgment in the
country, resonating significantly with the country’s significant, educated urban ladino
population. The massive anti-corruption protests taking place through April and May of
2015 were led by this frustrated middle class,96 even though there is little history of mass
94

Azpuru, “Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2010,” 164.
Viaene, “The Internal Logic of the Cosmos as ‘Justice’ and ‘Reconciliation,’” 296.
96
Tuckman, “Guatemala on the Brink of Crisis After Vice-President Falls to Corruption Scandal,” May 15,
2015.

95

89

demonstrations in Guatemala, let alone over government corruption which is generally
taken as a given.97 But, of course, that same acknowledgment and responsiveness that
seems to have gripped Guatemala’s Ladino middle class is still largely absent among the
country’s “fifth column”: its mostly rural Mayan-Indigenous population. For the majority
of Guatemala’s Mayan-Indigenous population, generations of dispossession, “acts of
genocide,” extreme poverty, and state-sponsored violence have left them largely
uninterested in politics,98 while rendering the state justice system “irrelevant” to them. In
sum, while CICIG has effectively touched off a nerve in the collective psyche of
Guatemala’s middle class through its transitional justice-related acknowledgment
function, it lacks responsiveness and relevance to the demographic which arguably needs
it and stands to benefit from it the most.
The “takeaway” I have argued in favour of, following my analysis of CICIG’s
function as a truth recovery mechanism, is that there is a need to enhance civil society’s
own truth recovery capacities while also assisting it to develop greater international
linkages. I have additionally argued that CICIG should—either moving forward in
Guatemala, or in other similar situations, should it be used as a model elsewhere—shift
its organizational mandate to be much more extensively focused on training and
subsequent oversight of Guatemalan public officials and institutions.
Moving forward to how such activities might help truth recovery affect
acknowledgment, the idea is to basically appropriate civil society as an interlocutor. The
highly “legalist” activities being coordinated by CICIG and its constituent parts of the
Guatemalan state and United Nations are representative of a political culture of
Westphalian diplomacy. To the many Mayan-Indigenous communities and individuals in
Guatemala, which as of 1996 only had 69 per cent enrolment in even basic primary
education,99 the norms and customs inherent in such a worldview are foreign and located
half a world away.100
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Civil society has a potentially vital role to play: Indigenous-Mayans generally do
not trust the state, and a CICIG staff, despite their best intentions, are still largely
unfamiliar and untrusted. Indeed, Anita Isaacs notes that local NGOs and civil society
actors with culturally sensitive and patient approaches to interacting with MayanIndigenous populations “stand in stark contrast to the environment truth commissions
provide,” referring to the impersonal touches of investigators from the CEH. 101
Connecting Mayan-Indigenous communities to the justice processes being undertaken by
CICIG and the Guatemalan state is a vital transitional justice process, given Guatemala’s
history. Civil society can play a role in introducing Mayan-Indigenous communities and
individuals to measures of both broad truth recovery of state and public official
malfeasance. More importantly, civil society can help to explain or translate the process
of acknowledgment that CICIG is affecting within the state in the hopes of “[restoring]
social harmony” built on the confirmation of wrongdoing.102 The importance of CICIG
building up institutional and individual capacities within the state, relative to truth and
acknowledgment then, is to initiate a productive relationship between the state and
Indigenous and/or campesino communities based on the provision of “justice and public
safety in an efficient and equitable way,”
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as a follow-up to the truth and

acknowledgment functions which civil society will have then assisted CICIG perform.

3.4c Retribution
Relative to the transitional justice value of CICIG’s retributive functions, there are three
particularly salient ones: First, CICIG’s prosecutions of emblematic cases have been met
with significant successes. The commission was integral in rendering Guatemalan
indictment of former President Efraín Ríos Montt as “the first national indictment for the
crime of genocide.”104 In its various successful retributive actions like prosecutions and
purges, CICIG’s actions have simultaneously vindicated the suffering of victims at the
hand of the state, deterred would-be perpetrators of illegal behaviour in the immediate
future, while establishing prosecutorial norms and expectations for the Guatemalan
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public. Secondly, successful retributive actions have offered a sense of finality and
closure to victims directly implicated by such actions. As discussed above, CICIG has
been heavily limited in the depth of its investigations. The three functions of uncovering
the truth of wrongdoings, even through emblematic cases representative of broader
patterns, in addition to the acknowledgment that such action was indeed wrong, and
finally some form of retribution are symbolically important: They allow for a broader
understanding of justice which appeals to those seeking retributive measures, 105 and
others seeking restorative outcomes.106 In short, they create the conditions necessary for
“reconciliation as coexistence,” 107 and potentially a modicum of trust based on an
“expectation of a shared normative commitment” moving forward.108
One final but major success for CICIG’s retributive functions is that the requisite
coordination behind investigation and retributive actions that CICIG pursues serves a
state-building as well as community-enhancing function. On the one hand, CICIG has
helped to build up the capacity of the state by eliminating one of the main obstacles to
effective justice and security outcomes: lack of information-sharing. 109 On the other
hand, CICIG has offered and subsequently nurtured a kernel of hope amongst
Guatemalans that their country’s long-standing problems of insecurity and impunity are
being downgraded: The country’s homicide prosecution rate rose from five percent to 30
percent in three short years under CICIG’s tutelage and a highly talented Attorney
General, in Claudia Paz y Paz.110 As the April and May 2015 protests against government
corruption suggest, such successes in justice outcomes are emboldening ordinary
Guatemalans to demand accountability where such an impulse did not previously exist.

105

This quest for retribution most commonly takes place where police presence and judicial reach are
lacking in some of the more rural areas of Guatemala, often resulting in an increase in “vigilante justice.”
See Donovan, “The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala,” 815.
106
Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza make the argument that the “Mayan belief system stresses the goal of
community reintegration, not punishment, for those who have committed a crime.” See Arriaza and RohtArriaza, “Social Reconstruction as a Local Process,” 169
107
De Greiff, “The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes,” 124.
108
Ibid., 125.
109
Briscoe and Stappers, Breaking the Wave, 40.
110
Claire O’Neill McCleskey, “Homicides Fall for Third Consecutive Year in Guatemala,” InSight Crime:
Organized Crime in the Americas, January 3, 2013, accessed May 25, 2015; available from
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/homicides-fall-third-consecutive-year-guatemala.
To provide a frame of reference, 70-80% of homicides are prosecuted in Canada. See Gary Mason, “A
Nation on the Brink,” The Globe and Mail, January 5, 2008.

92

CICIG’s attempts to effect retributive measures have faced some very significant
drawbacks—likely the most significant amongst the transitional justice functions that it
engenders. First, Perez Molina’s refusal to renew the wildly successful former Attorney
General Claudia Paz y Paz in addition to his prior insistence on letting CICIG’s mandate
lapse without renewal suggests that, “as vital as the prosecutions and reforms of recent
years have been, they remain fragile and reversible.” 111 Secondly, even with all of
Guatemala’s justice and security gains with CICIG’s help, organized crime was said to be
firmly in control of seven of Guatemala’s twenty-two provinces, as of 2010.112 Indeed,
where Amnesty International once referred to Guatemala as a “corporate mafia state,” it
runs a legitimate risk of becoming a state under the control of a transnational corporate
drug mafia, 113 which is able to traverse borders in Central America with relative
freedom.114 Without a more comprehensive and coordinated cross-border response to the
cocaine drug trade from the Andes to North America, CICIG’s retribution seeking
activities will remain largely unsustainable with limited reach inside the state.
Similar to truth recovery, CICIG’s successes relative to retribution show few
signs of being self-sustaining over the long-term. In truth recovery, this is largely because
the capacities and institutions are underdeveloped. That is a partial reason for its lack of
sustainability in retributive function as well, but the much more significant issue
confounding CICIG’s capacity for retribution over the long-term is transnational drug
crime’s relentlessness and unpredictability. Also, as I discussed earlier in this chapter
while analyzing CICIG’s strengths and weaknesses relative to its mandate, CICIG has
failed to effectively track and understand criminal networks—as well as the flow of both
drugs and money within such networks—outside of their ties to corrupt officials within
Guatemala’s government institutions.115 While transnational organized crime networks
have a significant capacity to wield influence inside of Guatemala, neither CICIG nor
Guatemalan authorities adequately understand how these networks function, nor do they
have a means of downgrading them without transnational coordination. Because illicit
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drug networks have operations in various states and are able to move people, drugs, and
money across borders with comparative ease, no single state will be able to stifle their
activities and influence altogether. In order to downgrade or eliminate transnational drug
networks and their influence in Guatemala or anywhere else in Latin America, a
transnational, multi-country effort augmented by comprehensive intelligence and
information sharing will undoubtedly be required.
As I have argued thus far, truth and acknowledgment are both generally pre- or
co-requisites for retribution to be effected. Additionally, truth and acknowledgment are
integral to establishing and maintaining procedural justice’s constituent agents of
responsiveness and temporality. The key cog in this entire process is a robust civil
society. If civil society has the capacity to uncover truth, connect truth with
acknowledgment, and then forward the process of justice by pushing for retributive or
reparative actions, then it can also apply the necessary focus and carry the necessary
normative clout to assuage the Guatemalan state into normative and legal compliance.
Indeed, in Guatemala, a stronger, more internationally connected civil society means:
First, a greater pool of truth, recognizing the “importance of speaking truth to power”;116
secondly, a more internally unified society in pursuit of accountability;117 and finally, an
insistence on the application of global justice norms, which almost universally include
some form of retribution or reparation.
Once transnational drug crime is entered into the proverbial fracas, however, civil
society’s capacity to capture a greater provision of truth, internal demographic cohesion,
and retributive action all becomes a moot point. While the Guatemalan state must, on
some level, be accountable to global justice and political norms, 118 transnational drug
116
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crime is by its very composition immune to such norms. Its use of “theatrical violence” in
Guatemala suggests that its leadership is actively flaunting its immunity to such norms.119
Meanwhile, the ease by which criminal operatives and narcotics navigate national borders
in Central and South America, despite heavy American pressure and huge sums of
funding for security initiatives in the region, is evidence of its ability to evolve and evade
accountability altogether. In conclusion, while any given state is prone to either
diplomatic and/or civil society pressures, sophisticated transnational criminal entities are
not. Thus, as long as transnational crime networks have an array of polities from which to
organize and operate, eliminating their existing influence and entrenchment in Guatemala
will be exceedingly difficult through strictly domestic interventions such as CICIG. A
well-coordinated regional strategy is vital in order to combat the disorder, crime, and
levels and modes of violence more severe than anywhere else in the world.120

3.5 Conclusion
CICIG’s mandate is primarily to investigate illicit groups; disband them through
prosecutions; and to make policy recommendations to combat impunity and the
regeneration of such groups. By the criteria of its own mandate, CICIG has seen some,
but ultimately very limited, successes. It has experienced success at uncovering illicit
links within the state apparatus but has been much less adept at uncovering and enabling
the dismantling of illicit links beyond the purview of the state. Moreover, continued,
ongoing impunity as well as a recent ‘backslide’ in justice outcomes under President
Perez Molina both suggest that despite various successful prosecutions, a strategy of
dismantling illicit networks through prosecution is largely unsustainable and limited in its
efficacy to boot. Finally, relative to making policy recommendations, it is largely a moot
point to evaluate the success of policy recommendations divorced from their outcomes.
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But outcomes related to policy recommendations are not a part of CICIG’s mandate, thus
this criteria is nearly impossible to judge on its own.
In essence, CICIG’s mandate can be viewed as having been wildly ambitious and
lacking in a requisite understanding of the illicit structures it was tasked with disbanding.
A better understanding of transnational drug crime’s strength and influence suggests to
me that most hopes for reforming the state to be able to control impunity and corruption
within its borders would be moot without a transnational address to such crime. Coupled
with an analysis of transitional justice processes and outcomes in Guatemala affected by
CICIG largely points in the same direction—transnational drug crime has the potential or
even likelihood of undercutting any justice and security reforms that CICIG could hope
to domestically affect.
For the three elements of transitional justice functions—truth, acknowledgment,
and retribution—that I have argued CICIG effects, I have suggested a major takeaway for
each so as to better augment CICIG’s successes. For truth, I make the case that as of now,
CICIG has failed to institute a means of self-sustain into the institutional and individual
capacities of Guatemala’s security and justice sectors. For acknowledgment, I argue that
CICIG has probably been the most successful of all three transitional justice functions.
That is, it has successfully cultivated and imbued a set of recognizable justice norms
within the state which have subsequently been taken up by Guatemala’s ladino middle
classes. However CICIG needs to find a way of connecting that zeitgeist with
Guatemala’s significant Indigenous-Mayan populations in order to affect justice where it
is most needed. Much of Guatemala’s indigenous population has merely tuned politics
out for reasons, perhaps partly due to lack of education, but also due to a litany of
disenfranchising state actions directed against them over time. By working to improve
civil society capacity, CICIG can cultivate greater resources for truth procurement, but
can also further develop the critical mass necessary to domestically hold the Guatemalan
state to account. After all, civil society generally functions as a “gatekeeper” between
indigenous populations and the state apparatus,121 and can help to navigate and explain
the actions of one to the other and vice versa. Finally, for retribution, a transnational or at
121
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least regional, coordinated effort is urgently required to combat destabilizing and
unpredictable influences emanating from transnational, narcotics-based criminal
networks. Guatemala faces the prospect of severe backslide in CICIG’s hard-earned
justice outcomes without some means of downgrading the capacity and influence of
regional drug crime.
Guatemala, then, requires greater sustainability built into its justice and security
sectors; greater responsiveness and connectivity between disenfranchised populations and
the justice-seeking actions of CICIG; and a regional and/or international strategy to
combat transnational organized crime. Ideally the latter requirement would precede the
rest—CICIG works on a fixed mandate, and it will be hard-pressed to enable greater
sustainability into Guatemala’s justice and security sectors as long as transnational crime
can so brazenly circumvent the state’s influence. Thus, without a coordinated strategy
against Latin American drug crime networks, CICIG’s work faces a losing battle over the
long term.
But Guatemala has shown an impressive array of improvements in its justice and
security sectors over the past few years despite a concomitant “wave of organized crime
and corruption that is quickly inundating Central America’s latest nascent narco-state.”122
But by focusing on increasing the capacities and international connectedness of
Guatemala’s civil society, CICIG can improve its truth recovery and acknowledgment
functions by increasing its pool of available testimony but also through connecting
Guatemala’s significant indigenous populations to the political arena: Greater numbers of
voices lead to better justice outcomes due to the pressure they can exert on the state.
CICIG ought to maintain a focus on changing the institutional culture, improved
prosecution and impunity-reduction metrics, and building on and channeling the “state of
effervescence [and readiness] for change” that large segments of Guatemalan citizenry
have exhibited in April and May of 2015. 123 But the fact remains that some sort of
substantial, coordinated international address to transnational drug crime in Latin
America is probably the most important factor, over the long-term, in successfully
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addressing CICIG’s mandate of enhancing accountability and justice in Guatemala. That
same address is, at once, the most important long-term factor in securing and enhancing
greater outcomes relative to CICIG’s transitional justice functions of truth;
acknowledgment; and retribution as well.
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4. CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have spanned a broad spectrum of analysis on topics ranging from
institutions to theoretical constructs, both generally pertaining to Guatemala, CICIG, and
transitional justice, writ-large. I have also discussed processes and outcomes related to
those institutions and theories from the intrastate to regional and even global levels of
analysis. To begin with, then, this concluding chapter summarizes the main arguments
inherent in the roughly one hundred pages written to this point. However I would also
like to leave the reader with some “takeaways,” so to speak. To that end, then, I will
discuss the prospect of establishing a CICIG-like institution elsewhere in Latin America.
Finally, I want to take the final portion of this conclusion to recommend some areas or
strands of research which I think would serve as useful rejoinders to the research and
discussion surrounding CICIG, procedural justice, and transitional justice in Latin
America, but perhaps useful in other areas of the globe which I am less familiar with,
academically-speaking.

4.1 Summary of Main Arguments
Chapter One focuses predominantly on the importance of considering procedural justice
within transitional justice processes. The main argument I have promulgated is that
procedural justice ought to be conceived of as the signaling of a new future and breaking
with the legacy of a profoundly unfair past. By establishing “fair procedures,” as defined
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by Tom R. Tyler,1 a post-conflict society marked by violence and grave human rights
abuses can then, and I would argue only then, enter into what John Rawls described as a
“cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”2 Using examples specific to Guatemala, but
also comparing and contrasting such examples against other transitional justice processes
throughout the world, I make the case that the vehicles by which Tyler’s “fair
procedures” can be realized are temporality and responsiveness. Put another way,
temporality, a focus on timely justice processes and outcomes, and responsiveness, a
focus on the needs and desires of victims, both signal a new future and a break with the
past, allowing for individuals to be able to start to trust state institutions.
An additional, but secondary, purpose of the first chapter is to argue in favour of
an increased recognition, definition, and, indeed, discussion of what procedural justice is
and what it looks like in the context of transitional justice. Many analysts have argued for
greater responsiveness and/or temporality in transitional justice processes without much
consideration of existing arguments to those ends. Alternatively, other academics have
argued for greater procedural justice without even an implicit recognition that they are, in
fact, employing concepts and ideas highly related to procedural justice. By recognizing
that many academics are touching on similar issues without necessarily engaging with
one another, I hope that the field of transitional justice will take heed and recognition of
such a state of affairs and look to be more inclusive, engaging, and constructive with one
another and build upon prior work related to procedural justice.
Chapter Two seeks to locate CICIG within transitional justice from both
institutional and functional perspectives. Relative to function, I argue that CICIG deepens
and broadens prior truth recovery efforts. Building off of its truth function, CICIG serves
as an acknowledgment that the Guatemalan state has failed to affect justice and is
additionally unresponsive to its citizen-victims of injustice. And finally, CICIG’s truth
and acknowledgment activities serve to augment and strengthen the state’s will and
capacity for exacting retribution against injustices perpetrated, both during and
subsequent to the country’s long civil war. After all, once the truth is revealed that the
1
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state or its deputies have acted illegally, and an acknowledgment of the state’s actions as
both legally and normatively wrong has been affected, it becomes much more difficult for
the state to evade tangible action to rectify such issues. Especially given the historically
preeminent legalistic and retributive vision of transitional justice, the result of such truth
and acknowledgment induced by CICIG in Guatemala has prompted the hybrid
institution and the state to enact some form of retributive action in many cases.3
Together, the three transitional justice functions of truth, acknowledgment, and
retribution serve to allow CICIG to herald “justice as a better future” to Guatemalan
society. 4 At once one can see the close relation between procedural justice and
transitional justice with such a revelation, remembering that “a history of unaddressed
massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to generate mistrust between groups and
in the institutions of the state, and to hamper or slow down the achievement of security
and development goals.”5 Thus, a key transitional justice aim is to affect a different and
better future for a society moving away from the conflict-ridden and unjust circumstances
that preceded it. I argue that trust and acknowledgment work together to situate CICIG as
something of a “follow-up” truth commission which posits a measure of temporality into
Guatemala’s long-standing, 6 or perhaps more appropriately, long-stalled, transitional
justice process. Moreover, retributive action resulting from such trust and
acknowledgment functions introduces a measure of responsiveness against long-standing
victimization and state intransigence.
The second part of Chapter Two looks at CICIG from an institutional standpoint.
I deemed it to be important to establish some comparable, regionally relevant institution
by which to compare CICIG. On the one hand, I argue that CICIG acts as a de facto
“follow-up” truth commission to Guatemala’s two truth commissions of the late 1990s.
More importantly, CICIG is often referred to in exceptional terms, which is at once both
empirically incorrect and also unhelpful.7 It is unhelpful because it mystifies and renders
3
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the institution incomparable, a less than ideal prospect for analysts looking to gain insight
from its composition, function, and/or results. Moreover, such a reference is factually
incorrect and requires an address—for example, Guatemala’s CICIG shares a significant
number of similarities with El Salvador’s Commission for Truth in El Salvador (CTES):
Both were born of bilateral, negotiated talks between the UN and a member state; both
have exhibited innovative actions to circumvent constitutional and realpolitik constraints;
and both have tackled the issue of impunity by directly agitating for institutional reform.
Of course, I detail several differences as well, such as the broader mandate which CICIG
has been endowed with, as well as quite divergent time frames between the two cases.
CTES, of course, was established immediately following the conclusion of the
Salvadoran civil war; meanwhile CICIG was constituted over ten years after the
conclusion of Guatemala’s civil war. But the point of such a comparison is, more than
anything, to illustrate how CICIG is not especially unique or unprecedented. By situating
CICIG amongst other similar institutions, I aim to uncloak the specter of uniqueness that
so many analysts have been quick to apply to the institution. In doing so, I hope to
encourage greater insight into the applicability of similar institutions in other future
settings. Moreover, such a comparison allows analysts to better understand, map, and
conceptualize CICIG in a more concrete manner, as a “follow-up” truth commission.
Chapter Three, similar to Chapter Two, is divided into two parts. The overall aim
of the chapter is to evaluate CICIG’s successes and its drawbacks. But CICIG must be
analyzed according to two criteria: First, it was a negotiated institution conceived by the
UN and Guatemalan state, and it ought to be evaluated against the mandate by which it
was officially constituted. But secondly, given that CICIG holds the potential to affect the
three main transitional justice functions of truth recovery, acknowledgment, and
retribution, its efficacy should also be evaluated in relation to those functions as well.
CICIG’s mandate was far too ambitiously constituted for the organization to be
reasonably expected to be able to fulfill. Relative to its mandate, then, CICIG has
experienced a mixed bag of successes and drawbacks. It has been relatively successful at
investigating, uncovering, and purging the state apparatus of corruption. That having
been said, its strategy of prosecution as a means of disbanding illicit elements infiltrating

102

the state in Guatemala has been limited in efficacy and is largely unsustainable over the
long-term, due to weak institutionalization and capacity development.
Relative to CICIG’s truth, acknowledgment, and retribution functions, three main
takeaways can be observed, respectively: First, Guatemala requires greater sustainability
built into its justice and security sectors. Secondly, CICIG and/or the Guatemalan justice
sector need to better connect their justice-seeking actions with victims of injustice in
order to see justice both recognized and acknowledged as a means of redeveloping trust
and cooperation within Guatemalan society. And finally, a transnational strategy (or
strategies) aimed at both the supply and demand of Latin American-procured and
trafficked drugs is required for any tangible, long-term success at reducing violence,
human rights violations, and blockages to transitional justice successes over the long
term. By addressing each of these issues that CICIG has encountered, the institution
would be better able to effect procedural justice, especially through enhanced
responsiveness to the victims of injustice. Also, one must also remember that temporality
and responsiveness usually go hand in hand. In this instance, if CICIG fails to affect
sustainable transitional justice outcomes now, then CICIG as a “follow-up” truth
commission to Guatemala’s two truth commissions from the late 1990s will also likely
fail to affect closure. Thus, a failure to achieve responsiveness theoretically has directly
negative repercussions concerning the institution’s capacity to affect temporality. As a
result, the vehicles, as it were, used to achieve procedural justice would be effectively
sunk. To remind the reader of my theoretical supposition, a lack of procedural justice,
then, negatively impacts the potential for positive transitional justice outcomes.

4.2 Establishing CICIG-Like Institutions in Colombia or Elsewhere?
Transnational criminal networks with an interest in a weak rule of law, judicial impunity,
and infiltration of state institutions, have been exceptionally successful at gaining a
foothold in Latin America. Despite 25 years of coordinated, transnational action by states
in the region to combat transnational crime, “[that] still has not stopped security from
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deteriorating in most of the countries in the hemisphere.”8 It is for this very reason that I
decided against analyzing the utility of a CICIG-like institution in Colombia, or any other
post-conflict state in Latin America currently dealing with a transitional justice process.9
Transnational crime in Latin America remains “semi-autonomous,” “amorphous,”
and “focused on controlling territory [while wielding] superior training and tactics.”10 For
these reasons, among others, such as a lack of a strategy aimed at reducing demand from
North American and European illicit drug markets, any Latin America-based strategy
aimed at improving the rule of law and enhancing justice outcomes will be met with
fierce resistance and constant evolution from such illicit networks. For example, former
Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s pet project, the Merida Initiative,11 has resulted in
cartels stepping up their efforts—and successes—in penetrating state institutions so as to
wield favour and influence through corruption. The same transnational cartels have also
expanded their “usage of heavy armament and military tactics” directed against the state
and its institutions.12 In any event, with criminal networks constantly evolving to evade
state and international sanction, and a surplus of already institutionally weak states in the
region, transnational crime has a very favourable atmosphere by which to further
incubate, even if it means changing its locales so as to evade law enforcement.13
Even if Guatemala or any other state becomes capable of securing stronger
institutional capacities and cultures relative to security and justice, such successes will
likely just foist the problem of organized crime-related violence, corruption, and
impunity onto another state (or number of states) in the region. To offer but one example
of the potential for this hypothetical situation, joint American-Colombian efforts against
8
Gino Costa, “Citizen Security and Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas: Current Situation and
Challenges in the Inter-American Arena,” SUR – International Journal on Human Rights 9.16 (June 2012):
145.
9
Colombia itself should not yet be considered a “post-conflict” state, but it has certainly downgraded its
civil conflict over the past twenty years to a very significant degree.
10
Steven Dudley, Transnational Crime in Mexico and Central America: Its Evolution and Role in
International Migration, The Regional Migration Study Group: Migration Policy Institute and Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (November 2012): 17.
11
The Merida initiative is a joint Mexican-American strategy aimed at downgrading the capacity for cartels
to flaunt insecurity, human rights, and the rule of law in Mexico, but residually throughout the region as
well. “Merida Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, accessed June 19, 2015,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/.
12
Tomás Ayuso, “Latin America’s Response to Narco-Fueled Transnational Crime,” Washington Report
on the Hemisphere 29.1 (2009): 3.
13
Briscoe and Stappers, Breaking the Wave, 4.
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Colombian drug cartels in the 1980s and 1990s did not lead to a reduction in criminal
activity, reduction in drug flows, or a reduction in violence and corruption. Instead, the
violence, corruption, and drug flows simply adjusted, evolved, and migrated. When the
United States and Colombia effectively cut maritime trafficking routes to North America
from Colombia, Colombian cartels responded by creating an alliance with Mexican ones
whereby the Colombians have relinquished distribution to the Mexicans. 14 Despite
extensive amounts of domestic and international funding spent on law enforcement in
Colombia and relative short term successes at securing the rule of law, ex-paramilitaries
and ex-guerilla combatants in Colombia are now rapidly becoming more deeply involved
in the transnational drug trade, often even working in conjunction with one another, and
transforming both the Colombian internal armed conflict and the prospects for its
resolution.15 Worth noting is that once more, similar to Guatemala’s recent socio-political
trajectory, an observable link exists between combatants responsible for war-time human
rights abuses and current day criminal activity. As I argued in the previous chapter, this
link between civil war combatants and contemporary criminal impunity has direct
ramifications for transitional justice processes.
The main reasons, then, why I have decided to hold off on recommending a
CICIG-like institution elsewhere in Latin America as a means of securing more
comprehensive transitional justice outcomes are as follows: First, without a
comprehensive regional-transnational address to the supply-side of drugs and other illicit
commodities, establishing an institution like CICIG in another country will ultimately be
inadequate over the long-term for securing a “break from the past.” 16 It may force
transnational criminal elements to innovate and shift their modus operandi, but it would
not eliminate the market for illicit goods nor prevent criminal elements from undermining
the rule of law either in different ways or in other nearby jurisdictions. Moreover, the
international donor and development communities are hesitant to make long-term

14

Ayuso, “Latin America’s Response to Narco-Fueled Transnational Crime,” 3.
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16
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commitments, 17 while also determining much of their aid and development spending
according to the state of their economy rather than the needs of donor recipients.18 In
other words, there are limited resources from the international community—and those
limited resources would be best spent on “[developing] comprehensive, long-term
policies that can reverse this negative trend [of increasing transnational organized
crime].”19
A supply-side address to drug trafficking is highly unlikely to be successful
without a demand-side approach to the problem as well, which falls into the realm of
North American and European policy domains. One means of regulating the drug trade,
downgrading its propensity for violence, and reducing harm amongst drug users has been
gaining hold in some policy circles: legalizing and/or decriminalizing narcotics.20 Yet,
noting that there is no “miracle cure” to the legal and social ills of illicit drugs and their
trade, 21 and the failure or limited success of supply-side addresses, 22 Latin American
states are beginning to place greater pressure on Europe and North America. Specifically,
the United States is being increasingly called upon to reduce the demand for drugs in its
respective jurisdictions.23 While decriminalization or legalization may be one means by
which to address to the demand-side of the drug industry, public awareness campaigns
explaining the societal detriment that transnational criminal networks responsible for the
cultivation, transport, and marketing of drugs in Latin America may also be necessary.
17
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20
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Given the connection between drug use and public health, Randolph and Viswanath have
instructively noted while researching public awareness campaigns relative to public
health that public awareness campaigns are “uniformly considered to be powerful tools
capable of promoting healthy social change.”24 Regardless of the options of supply- and
demand-side approaches pursued, a transnational address to transnational organized
crime is absolutely vital in securing greater security and justice outcomes in Guatemala,
but elsewhere throughout the entire region as well.

4.3 Research Directions Moving Forward
To conclude this thesis, I would like to highlight the areas of my research which I believe
deserve greater attention moving forward from civil society investigation, especially as it
pertains to academia. To those ends, I will chronologically outline some of the key
themes that have consistently left me perplexed and with the desire to further investigate.
In the interests of keeping this thesis focused and within a reasonable length and purview,
I have refrained from doing so myself to this point. So, to begin with, procedural justice
is really just in its infancy relative to transitional justice. A greater degree of theoretical
discussion of how and where it fits into the field would be a useful means of
consolidating and building off of the extant research within the field, 25 but also in
drawing greater influence from outside of specifically transitional justice-focused
scholars. I have defined my own vision of how procedural justice fits into the lexicon, but
such ideas merit much more frequent and coordinated discussion and debate.
Another useful area of research would be to build upon my rudimentary
classification of CICIG as a hybrid, bilaterally negotiated truth commission similar to
CTES. By building off of the initial classification I have established, conducting deeper
24

Whitney Randolph and K. Viswanath, “Lessons Learned from Public Health Mass Media Campaigns:
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institutional and causal investigations behind these and other similar institutions, the
field’s understanding of the roles that hybrid and/or “follow up” truth commissions can
and do undertake would be a valuable addition to existing truth commission literature.
Most importantly, a greater investigation into which conditions are most precipitous for
either CICIG’s and/or CTES’ success and/or failure would be useful. Through such an
investigation, analysts could better determine the success of CICIG- or CTES-like hybrid
truth commissions moving forward with more veracity. Alternatively, perhaps hybrid
truth commissions such as CICIG or CTES are less preferable to another institutional
arrangement. Such a proposition is beyond the purview of this thesis, for the most part,
outside of my recognition and explanation that a transnational address to transnational
crime ought to precede any CICIG-like institutional response to transitional justice issues
that plague the region today. Despite my classification of CICIG as a “follow-up,” hybrid
truth commission of sorts, I have only opened up the discussion, as opposed to having
definitively established much beyond that.
Perhaps of most interest to me, an enigma that constantly left me wanting for the
dearth in the literature, but also because of how useful it would have been to my research
program, is the nature of how hybrid institutions like CICIG and civil society both
interact and have the institutional capacity to potentially interact in different ways yet to
be observed. Hybrid institutions are only now starting to make a dent, so to speak, in
post-conflict and transitional justice literature. There are, however, various constructivist
theories of civil society and state, with authors including Naomi Roht-Arriaza and
especially Kathryn Sikkink among the most active in the pursuit of such research with an
eye towards Latin America and transitional justice.26 Analysts can, and I certainly have,
garnered much insight into how civil society, states, the international community, and
hybrid institutions all work together to positively affect transitional justice outcomes
based on the work of scholars like Roht-Arriaza and Sikkink. I have attempted to provide
certain causal explanations for how such actors interact often based on their prior work,
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but certainly greater focus and insight is required to either confirm, augment, or thicken
the understanding that I lay out in the preceding pages.
Finally, another major area requiring further research and discussion is the
relation between transnational criminal networks in Latin America and transitional
justice. What factor or set of factors is most responsible for the state of transnational
crime in Latin America, and how do they relate back to the region’s legacies of civil
armed conflict, injustice, and human rights violations? This general predicament, in itself,
is very much a “chicken or egg” quandary. While the “reasons for conflict” in a particular
state and the region in general have long been debated, the rise of transnational criminal
networks in Latin America over the past 25 years are only now starting to occupy a
central spot in social science literature. As such, a greater attention to law enforcement,
transnational crime, and post-conflict justice is an area that ought to accompany the, up
until now, mostly policy-focused investigation of transnational criminal networks in
Latin America. CICIG’s initial mandate is a strong testament to the fact that transitional
justice has been heavily focused on justice vis-à-vis the state—and in the case of
Guatemala, such a focus has promoted an unrealistic vision and set of institutional goals
for the institution to tackle. I am suggesting that transitional justice-focused scholars must
recognize the extant literature relative to the region which views transnational crime and
justice outcomes in a highly covariate relationship. From there, transitional justice
analysts with an eye towards Latin America can then develop an even thicker
understanding of post-conflict justice processes in the region.
Outside of the first research suggestion of exploring procedural justice, an
underlying theme permeates the rest of the preceding research directions that I have
outlined. That could best be described as a need to treat transitional justice as a dynamic,
ongoing, longer-term process. Too much of the transitional justice literature with regards
to Guatemala and Latin America is retrospective. Though there is certainly great value in
such academic endeavours, there is also a need to engage in cutting edge research as the
processes of transitional justice are unfolding. CICIG, for example, has been the subject
of surprisingly little social scientific inquiry despite now being eight years old and having
very significantly influenced the socio-political landscape of Guatemala and Central
America. Significant issues in public policy, for every country in the Americas and many
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beyond, are shaped by current events taking place in Guatemala and other Latin
American nations nearby: Issues concerning large parts of the world related to
immigration to law enforcement to the economy are all affected by Latin America’s
socio-political landscape. I hope that my analysis of Guatemala and CICIG, particularly
in the third chapter, has shone some light on what is effectively the “canary in the
coalmine.” To that end, my overall “takeaway” for research directions moving forward
relative to transitional justice, Guatemala, and Latin America in general, then, is for
analysts to take a more active interest in researching and publishing on contemporary
events, even if the conclusions we are able to draw are incomplete and cloudy at best. By
analyzing CICIG concurrent to its mandate, we are able to better augment and change its
course when it appears to be struggling. Doing so should allow for better transitional
justice outcomes for individuals in Guatemala who have been victimized past and
present. However, such research would also help to supplement policy decisions by
countries dealing with the residual effects of socio-political developments in Guatemala
and elsewhere in the region, from law enforcement, to migration, to the maintenance of
trade markets.
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